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Abstract
This dissertation attempts in three essays to contribute to the research on emerging market
crises. A particular focus is set on problems associated with sudden stops of capital
inflows, which appear to have been the cause of many recent emerging market crises.
The main contributions to the existing literature are: (1) the empirical investigation of the
effects of sudden stops and currency collapses using bank- and firm-level data, and (2)
the development of micro-founded theoretical models which explain the transmission and
amplification of unexpected external shocks in emerging market economies in an open
economy framework.
The first essay investigates in a cross-country study how domestic bank credits are
affected during sudden stops. A particular focus is set on the asymmetric effects across
individual banks. In the empirical investigation of 14 recent sudden stops that occurred
in 11 Latin American and Asian countries, we find that sudden stops are associated with
reductions in the domestic lending volume in the order of 10-15% of GDP. The magnitude
of this decline depends on the structure of the domestic banking sector, especially, on the
degree of bank capitalization and foreign bank participation.
The second essay investigates the channel between currency depreciations, liability
dollarization, and income distributions. In the empirical investigation on recent currency
collapses in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, we find that income and wealth transfers
from borrowing firms to lenders increased substantially with the currency depreciations,
especially in Argentina. Moreover, the currency depreciations had asymmetric effects on
firms. Most affected were non-exporting firms with high fractions of foreign-currency
denominated liabilities. The distributive issues of currency depreciations are further ana-
lyzed within a partial equilibrium model of firms with varying income and debt structures.
Finally, the third essay develops a two-sector general equilibrium model of a small
open economy to explore the transmission mechanisms of external financial shocks. We
set up a cash-in-advance model with limited participation augmented with financial fric-
tions in the form of a ’fundamentals-related’ risk premium on external funds. The friction
amplifies the economic effects of external financial shocks, especially, when the economy
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is highly indebted in foreign currency. For a set of Latin American economies, the theo-
retical model is calibrated to match the empirical impulse responses of output, investment,
trade balance, and domestic credits in response to a shock to the country risk premium.
The dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, we present a survey of the
existing literature on sudden stops and embed the three essays of this dissertation in the
literature on EM crises (Section 1.6). The three essays are presented in Chapters 2 to 4.
2
Chapter 1
Lessons from sudden stops
1.1 Introduction
In the process of globalization, emerging market (EM) economies get increasingly inte-
grated with the international economic and financial system. Global players ranging from
non-financial firms, banks, to investment funds have increased substantially their activi-
ties in EMs throughout the last century to participate in their growth potential and to open
up the underdeveloped markets. In many EM economies, foreign-owned enterprises and
banks have become the largest players in the host countries promoting economic growth
and stability. To grow faster than in financial autarky, EM economies can borrow ex-
ternal funds on international capital markets to finance investment and increase economic
growth. The underlying risk in this process is that borrowers systematically underestimate
certain risks, accumulate too much external debt, and rely on dangerous forms of borrow-
ing. Such structural weaknesses make EM economies vulnerable to external shocks and
are often the source of EM crises. An important and repeatedly observed concomitant of
the globalization process is the Sudden Stop phenomenon, advanced by Calvo (1998b),
which is seen as the triggering factor of the recurrent currency and financial crises that
occurred in Latin America and Asia throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s.
In a sudden stop, an economy that has been the recipient of foreign capital inflows,
all of a sudden, stops receiving them, and instead faces withdrawals of investments and
the inability to roll over the part of external debt that is falling due. Such unexpected and
massive reductions in the supply of foreign capital are the result of an overreaction on
financial markets. In many cases, the capital flight appears to be the result of increased
investors’ uncertainty about the credit worthiness of the balance sheet of the particular
economy, and its exchange rate. The incertitude may originate from questions about
either the balance sheet, or the exchange rate, but when there is a question about one, the
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implied capital flight makes it a question about both (Dornbusch (2001)). To the extent
that there are limitations in the domestic supply of capital, sudden stops spread out to
the whole economy. More precisely, when individuals perceive the risk of an upcoming
crisis, they lower their demand for assets denominated in domestic currency and try to
convert foreign-currency into domestic-currency denominated liabilities (Calvo (1998b)).
As a result, the initial shock is amplified by a drop in domestic asset prices. When the
domestic banking sector is subject to important capital withdrawals, a sudden stop can
trigger a banking crisis and have damaging effects on investment and growth. When the
capital withdrawals are large relative to international reserves, a sudden stop can trigger a
currency collapse. When, in addition, the economy is highly indebted in foreign currency,
a sudden stop can result in a debt crisis. Both the size of the sudden stop and its economic
effects depend ultimately on factors such as an economy’s trade openness, the structure
of its balance sheet, and the confidence in domestic policy (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia
(2004), Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006), and Mendoza (2006b)).
Sudden stops are not a new phenomenon. As Bordo (2006) points out, the recent
episodes of sudden stops are similar to a series of crises during the late 19th century in
which several emerging countries were affected by massive declines in capital flows from
the countries of Western Europe. A series of currency, banking, and debt crises occurred
during that time. The pattern of these episodes is similar: There is too much credit in
the run up to the crisis and too little once the crisis hits (Taussig (1928) and Dornbusch
(2001)). International contagion seems to be an important source of sudden stops. In
several papers, Calvo argues that Systemic Sudden Stops originating in global capital
markets are a key determinant of the financial and economic turbulence in EM economies
(Calvo (1998a), Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004), and Calvo and Talvi (2005)). Inter-
national contagion has been at play during the Tequila crisis of 1994-95, the Asian crisis
of 1997, the Russian crises of 1998, and the Argentine crisis of 2001-02. In each case, the
contagion had different origins (Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), Baig and Goldfajn
(1999), Baig and Goldfajn (2000), and Calvo and Talvi (2005)). For instance, common
creditor linkages coupled with increased risk aversion on global capital markets appear
to have triggered a general cutback in lending to EM economies following the Russian
crisis. In many EM economies, the external shock and its amplification led to important
current account reversals, currency collapses, and contractions in GDP, investment, and
domestic credits.
Ultimately, EM economies must be prepared for such situations of market turbulence,
since they constitute a recurrent phenomenon of the globalization process. The solution
is to design domestic and global policies that minimize the likelihood that initially small
shocks culminate in sudden stops and full-blown crises. And the key to the solution is the
complete understanding of the origins and the dynamics of EM crises. In the following,
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we present an overview of the existing literature on sudden stops.
This chapter is organized as follows. Potential sources of sudden stops are discussed
in Section 1.2. In particular, we focus on domestic factors which make countries vul-
nerable to sudden stops and on different forms of international contagion. Moreover, we
discuss recent systemic sudden stop episodes in EM economies and present the main em-
pirical findings of the existing literature on the determinants of sudden stops. Section 1.3
discusses the macroeconomic effects of sudden stops and analyzes the causality between
sudden stops, twin crises, and debt crises. The main results of the theoretical literature on
sudden stops are summarized in Section 1.4. Domestic and global policy challenges are
discussed in Section 1.5. In the final section, we embed the three essays of this dissertation
in the existing literature and line out our contributions.
1.2 Sources of sudden stops
In the mid 1990s, a period of recurrent EM crises has been initiated ending, for the time
being, with the Argentine crisis in 2001-02. In a recent paper, Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Talvi (2006) point out that many of these crises had a systemic component, because a
wide range of EM countries was hit by sudden stops at approximately the same time.
This points to the fact that international contagion is at the heart of many sudden stops
( Baig and Goldfajn (2000), Calvo (1998c), and Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh (2003)).
The main theme of the sudden stop literature is that international contagion plays a key
role in triggering sudden stops, but that a country’s own structural weaknesses and pol-
icy mistakes create the underlying vulnerability. In the following, we describe the most
important sources of sudden stops taking into account these two dimensions: (1) the struc-
tural weaknesses that make countries vulnerable to a sudden stop (internal factors); and
(2) different forms of international contagion (external factors). Thereafter, we describe
recent series of sudden stops in Latin America and Asia to highlight whether structural
vulnerabilities and/or contagion have been at the center of the considered episodes. The
sections from 1.2.1 to 1.2.3 draw largely on Roubini and Setser (2004), Chapter 2, and
Fischer (2001).
1.2.1 Internal vulnerabilities
As noted, many sudden stops are the result of market overreactions in which international
investors rush to withdraw their funds from a particular economy. The literature has fixed
the following domestic vulnerabilities which appear to increase the likelihood of sudden
stops. First, large and persistent macroeconomic imbalances, such as current account and
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fiscal deficits, lead to the accumulation of large stocks of public and external debt. This
increases an economy’s debt burden and is likely to increase investors’ uncertainty about
the repayment capacity of that economy. Second, financing these deficits with short-term
and foreign-currency debt makes the economy vulnerable to a liquidity run and increases
the risk of a currency depreciation that triggers a debt crisis, because of the depreciation’s
balance sheet effect (Roubini and Setser (2004)). For instance, when an economy’s level
of international reserves is significantly smaller than its short-term obligations, a run on
the economy’s securities can result in a currency collapse or debt crisis. Investors are
aware of such mechanisms and are likely to be more sensitive to bad news in economies
that suffer from such balance sheet mismatches. Balance sheet mismatches can result for
several reasons. Maturity mismatches often result from the fact that external lenders are
not willing to borrow long-term funds to EM economies, and firms or banks in EMs tend
to finance their longer-lasting investment projects by rolling over short-term funds. A bor-
rower, who falsely expects a stable macroeconomic environment, may be unable to roll
over his existing debt and be forced to liquidate ongoing investment projects. Currency
mismatches in EM economies arise, because external creditors tend to prefer to lend in
hard currencies (Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2002) and Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Mejia (2004)). In other cases, the domestic banking system is not willing to lend in local
currency at reasonable prices (Honig (2005)), as was the case in Argentina prior to its
crisis. Domestic banks transfered the currency risk to domestic firms which borrowed
in dollars and had local-currency income. Since financial market participants know that
such mismatches are a source of financial fragility, they are likely to be more sensitive
to rumors in countries that are subject to such weaknesses. Third, doubt about the cred-
ibility of a government’s commitment to take the policy steps that assure its long-term
credit worthiness tends to increase investors’ uncertainty and the likelihood of a liquidity
run (Roubini and Setser (2004)). Fourth, fixed exchange rates increase the possibility that
borrowers underestimate currency risk and rely on too much foreign-currency debt. Moral
hazard considerations play an important role in this context. In the case of an exchange
rate devaluation, firms may be unable to repay their loans and expect a bailout by the gov-
ernment. And finally, poor banking regulation, implicit or explicit government guarantees,
and other microeconomic distortions can lead to excessive investment and overreliance on
dangerous forms of borrowing. Particularly in Asia, the expectation of government guar-
antees seem to have encouraged domestic banks to take on excessive risks in the form of
large stocks of external short-term credits (Roubini and Setser (2004)). Combined with
poor regulation and supervision, this can result in important financial vulnerabilities of
particular sectors. Countries that are subject to such structural weaknesses generally have
little capacity to respond to adverse, temporary shocks by borrowing on international cap-
ital markets. On the contrary, the initial shock is likely to be amplified by adverse balance
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sheet effects and the resulting capital flight (Roubini and Setser (2004)). Given these
weaknesses, sudden stops can be triggered by both domestic or external shocks be it, for
example, upcoming elections, weakening governments, deteriorations in terms of trade,
interest rate changes in the world’s major financial centers, or changes in the willingness
of international investors to invest in EM assets.
1.2.2 International contagion
Having discussed the structural weaknesses which make EM economies vulnerable to
sudden stops, we discuss in the following different forms of international contagion. First,
trade linkages and pressures for competitive devaluations are potential sources of interna-
tional contagion. More precisely, when a country devalues, its trading partner will lose
competitiveness. In this case, investors may put pressure on the trading partner’s currency,
or policymakers in this country may decide to devalue to prevent losing the export mar-
ket share (Roubini and Setser (2004)). The prospect of this can trigger massive capital
flight from this country. Such pressures seem to have been present in Argentina following
Brazil’s currency devaluation of 1999, and in Asia following Thailand’s currency deval-
uation of 1997. Second, the onset of a crisis in one country can highlight the risks of
a certain financial vulnerability, a so-called ’wake-up call’ (Roubini and Setser (2004)).
When investors are sensitive to such news, they may decide to reduce their exposure to
countries with similar financial vulnerabilities. Third, common creditor linkages are im-
portant sources of contagion. International investors typically have exposure to many
different EM economies. Losses, or their prospects, in one country may lead the investor
to sell other EM assets, in order to restore liquidity or to decrease the risk of his port-
folio. This process can drive EM asset prices down and produce losses for all investors
with similar positions triggering other rounds of sales. Such mechanisms were present
in the aftermath of the Russian debt crisis, especially, in Latin America (Calvo and Talvi
(2005) and Roubini and Setser (2004)). Finally, imperfect information about the state of
an economy and herd behavior among investors are important factors of contagion (Calvo
and Mendoza (2000) and Roubini and Setser (2004)). For instance, some investors may
have inferior information than others and may not know whether some key investors are
selling their EM assets, because of a margin constraint, or because of superior informa-
tion about an upcoming crisis. Such information asymmetry can result in an amplifying
process, if enough uninformed investors follow the actions taken by a particular group of
investors. The prospect of this can trigger massive capital flight, since each investor will
try to withdraw his funds before the others do (self-fulfilling prophecy).
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1.2.3 Recent series of sudden stops
In this section, we analyze recent sudden stop episodes in which several countries have
been affected at approximately the same time. Our main purpose is to clarify which
domestic vulnerabilities and which form of international contagion can explain the spill-
overs to other countries. In particular, we consider four episodes of systemic sudden
stops in Latin America and Asia. At the center of theses episodes have been the crises
in Mexico 1994-95, Thailand 1997, Russia 1998, and Argentina 2001-02. The Mexican,
Thai, Russian, and Argentine crises are in some aspects similar. In Mexico, Thailand,
and Argentina a persistent current account deficit combined with a pegged exchange rate
increased over time investors’ uncertainty about the credibility of the exchange rate ar-
rangement (Fischer (2001) and Roubini and Setser (2004)). Neither in Mexico nor in
Thailand there was a fiscal problem, although both governments were facing large costs
during the crisis resolution (Roubini and Setser (2004)). In each case, particular sectors
were subject to balance sheet mismatches and vulnerable to a liquidity run and currency
depreciation. The associated crises spread out to a variety of EM economies in terms of
exchange rate systems, capital controls, fiscal stance, growth performance, and balance
sheet mismatches. In the following, we discuss the four episodes in more detail.
Lessons from 1995
In the case of Mexico, concerns about the exchange rate and a persistent current account
deficit increased the possibility of a devaluation (Roubini and Setser (2004)). More-
over, the economy inherited important structural weaknesses in the form of currency
mismatches on the private sector’s balance sheet. In addition, Mexico faced increased
country risk caused by a number of political shocks (Chiapas revolt and assassination of
a presidential candidate) and an external shock in form of an increase in US interest rates
(Roubini and Setser (2004)). The shocks seem to have triggered the increased unwilling-
ness to invest in Mexican assets and resulted in an important decrease in the roll-over rate
of outstanding debt. The final result was an important sudden stop and a current account
reversal of 9% of GDP. Output, consumption, and investment fell by magnitudes that ex-
ceeded their business cycle standard deviations by a factor of three (Mendoza (2006b)).
Because the devaluation was postponed by shortening and dollarizing debt (Tesobonos),
the adverse balance sheet effects of the currency depreciation were large, especially, for
the public sector. A bailout program was implemented for crisis resolution with important
financial support from the Unites States (Roubini and Setser (2004)). The devaluation and
depth of the Mexican crisis raised concerns about other EMs’ exchange rate arrangements
and financial stability triggering a short-lived reversal in capital flows to a particular group
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of EM economies (Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996)).1 It seems that the contagion had
elements of a wake-up call which increased the investors’ unwillingness to invest in a set
of countries with similar fundamentals and financial profiles. The lesson of this episode is
that even if the long-term capacity to pay is sufficient to cover obligations, economies can
get into serious solvency problems, if a critical mass of investors refuses to roll over short-
term bonds (Mexico), or withdraws bank deposits (Argentina) (Calvo and Talvi (2005)).
Lessons from 1997
At the beginning, the Thai crisis looked similar to the Mexican crisis: Thailand was de-
fending a pegged exchange rate in the face of a large current account deficit, increasing
perceived country risk, and a vulnerable financial sector (Fischer (2001) and Roubini and
Setser (2004)). Concerns about the sustainability of Thailand’s exchange rate peg in-
creased over time. Moreover, a large stock of short-term debt made Thailand vulnerable
to a liquidity run. The resulting sudden stop was immense and appear to have triggered the
abandonment of the exchange rate peg. The regional markets faced increasing pressure in
the aftermath of the baht devaluation, and concerns about the exchange rate arrangements
and financial stability raised in the neighboring countries. As the situation worsened,
intense foreign exchange and stock market turmoil spread out in the entire region culmi-
nating in sudden stops and currency collapses in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea (Baig
and Goldfajn (1999)).2 Recurrent news of economic and political distress, particularly
bank and corporate fragility, increased the uncertainty throughout the year 1998. Many
of the currency collapses seem to have involved speculative attacks caused by contagion
(Fischer (2001)). The discussion suggests that the contagion originated from devalua-
tion pressures following the baht devaluation, and an across the board loss of confidence
which seem to have been triggered by concerns about common financial vulnerabilities
of regional private sectors (Baig and Goldfajn (1999)). The lesson of this episode is that
crises can hit countries with high growth records, and that liquidity crises are not only
possible in the case of bonded debt, but also in the case of foreign bank loans to the
private sector (Calvo and Talvi (2005)).
1Most affected have been Argentina and Brazil.
2The contagion hit, as in the case of Indonesia and Korea, economies with relatively small current
account and fiscal deficits, however, with serious financial and corporate sector weaknesses in the form of a
large stock of debt and important currency mismatches. The Asian crisis hit most Thailand, Indonesia and
Korea, while the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong experienced minor recessions. Malaysia
is the intermediate case.
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Lessons from 1998
The Russian crisis involved doubts about the credibility of its exchange rate peg and
concerns about solvency in light of important maturity and currency mismatches on the
highly leveraged financial and public sectors’ balance sheets (Roubini and Setser (2004)).
As a result of the increasing concerns, Russia faced important capital flight at the begin-
ning of 1998 culminating in the devaluation and the sovereign debt default (mainly on
ruble-denominated treasury bills (GKOs)). Following the Russian crisis another round of
capital flight from EM economies occurred, especially, in Latin America (Baig and Gold-
fajn (1999) and Calvo and Talvi (2005)). Sudden stops occurred in Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.3 It seems that the contagion came through
the common creditor channel whereby highly leveraged investors in EM economies (sev-
eral EM hedge funds such as LTCM) suffered important losses from the Russian default.
The subsequent liquidity crunch caused a general ’sell off of EM bonds across the board
at fire sale prices to meet margin calls’ (Calvo and Talvi (2005)). The refusal of the IMF
to bailout the Russian government added to the overreaction on global capital markets.
The lessons of this episode are that a country can experience a combined currency, bank-
ing, and sovereign debt crisis in the absence of a current account deficit (Roubini and
Setser (2004)), and that highly leveraged EM hedge funds with unexpected losses from
one market can transmit crises through the common creditor channel and trigger a run on
EM securities (Calvo and Talvi (2005)).
Lessons from 2001-02
The Argentine crisis originated in 1998, when capital flows to EM economies slowed
down, and it became increasingly difficult to finance the accumulated external debt, es-
pecially of the public sector (Calvo and Talvi (2005)). Moreover, the currency board
resulted in an overvalued currency and important currency mismatches on the corporate
and public sectors’ balance sheets (Roubini and Setser (2004)). Given a largely dollarized
economy, the deteriorated growth outlook put in question the solvency of the economy,
and the prospect of a highly dangerous devaluation triggered massive capital flight in
2001. At the end of 2001, the government was forced to abandon the currency board
and to impose capital controls and banking holidays. The Argentine crisis culminated in
a payment suspension on parts of the outstanding external sovereign debt. The adverse
balance sheet effects of the currency collapse affected principally the corporate sector,
but also the banking sector experienced important distress by a combination of bank runs,
3The Brazilian crisis, for instance, was centered on a large stock of short-term debt which was in many
cases dollar-linked. The devaluation prospects increased doubts about solvency and appear to have culmi-
nated in a sudden stop and a currency collapse.
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increased loan defaults, and the asymmetric ’pesification’ of loans and deposits (Barajas,
Basco, Juan-Ramon, and Quarracino (2007)). Moreover, firms were not able to adjust
their prices in response to the devaluation as the government imposed price freezes in
particular sectors. The Argentine crisis seem to have triggered a series of sudden stops
in Latin America including countries like Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay.4 The
regional contagion had elements of devaluation pressures and common creditor linkages
which resulted in increased concerns about the regional stability. At the center of the
Argentine crisis was the misaligned marcoeconomic policy that resulted in high levels
of domestic liability dollarization (foreign-exchange denominated debt contracts in the
domestic capital market) and an uncredible exchange rate (Calvo and Talvi (2005)).
1.2.4 Empirical findings
After having discussed qualitatively potential determinants of sudden stops, we summa-
rize the empirical evidence of investigations conducted for three large panels of countries.
First, we discuss the empirical identification of sudden stops, before summarizing the
econometric results on the determinants of sudden stops.
Sudden stop identification
Sudden stops are extreme events, more precisely, unexpected and large drops in foreign
capital inflows. An aggregate measure of capital inflows is the financial account balance,
a summary of net capital flows. It is composed of net foreign direct investment, net port-
folio investment, and other investments excluding official transfers associated with IMF
programs. In most empirical work, sudden stops are identified by considering the first
and second moments of the financial account series: Sudden stops are defined as periods
in which capital inflows fall one (or two) standard deviation(s) below its long-term aver-
age. This measure, however, should be augmented with additional information since, in
absence of external intervention, changes in the financial account are offset by changes
in the current account and vice versa. For instance, given a constant level of interna-
tional reserves, the financial account may drop because of an export boom.5 Inferring
4Brazil also faced a political shock in the form of upcoming presidential elections in face of a large stock
of external public debt. In Uruguay, bank deposits fell by 30%, and a large part of this fall can be attributed
to deposit withdrawals by Argentine residents.
5From an analytical point of view, the current account may jump from a deficit to a surplus for three
reasons: (1) From the intertemporal perspective, a transitory terms of trade or productivity gain may increase
output more than expenditure; (2) the current account deficit may be unsustainable, e.g. due to a misaligned
exchange rate; and (3) external causes may reduce capital inflows. The real exchange rate would depreciate
and capital inflows would reverse in all cases, while output would suffer only in the last two cases.
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causality gives rise to an identification problem and the central question is whether capi-
tal flows dominate the current account or the other way round (Goldfajn (2001)). Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006) overcome this iden-
tification problem by either requiring that the sudden stop is associated with an output
contraction, or a sharp increase in the country’s external funding costs measured by J.P.
Morgan’s EM Bond Index (EMBI). Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) use quarterly data
and identify sudden stops by the following three criteria: (1) the period includes at least
one observation where the year-to-year fall in quarterly capital flows lies at least two stan-
dard deviations below its sample mean; (2) the sudden stop episode begins (ends) when
the year-to-year fall (rise) in capital inflows falls (rises above) one standard deviation be-
low its sample mean; and (3) there is an associated output contraction.6 Calvo, Izquierdo,
and Talvi (2006) introduce a measure for systemic sudden stops (3S) in which the third
criterion is replaced by a criterion that requires that there is an associated sharp increase
in external funding costs. Eichengreen, Gupta, and Mody (2006), Guidotti, Sturzenegger,
and Villar (2004) and Cavallo and Frankel (2004) who work with annual data use the
mean and one-standard deviation band of the financial account to identify sudden stops,
and are therefore subject to the mentioned identification problem. Recent sudden stops
identified with these definitions are summarized in Table 1.1. Argentina and Turkey ap-
pear to be most vulnerable to sudden stops, since both countries experienced a sudden
stop three times since the mid 1990s. Another interesting observation is that sudden stops
are not restricted to crisis-prone economies, but also occur in countries with solid funda-
mentals like in Chile or Singapore. Finally, sudden stops are likely to affect more than one
country at the same time which confirms that international contagion is a key determinant
of sudden stops.
Determinants of sudden stops
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004), Cavallo and Frankel (2004) and Eichengreen, Gupta,
and Mody (2006) investigate empirically the determinants of sudden stops for a large
number of countries. Table 1.2 gives an overview of these studies. The common ap-
proach is to determine which structural factors significantly affect the probability of ex-
periencing a sudden stop using Logit- or Probit-models for panel data. In all studies, the
dependent variable is an indicator variable that identifies the sudden stop periods. The
explanatory variables typically include measures for trade openness, the composition of
debt, reserve adequacy, exchange rate systems, debt sustainability, relative prices, and
6The first and second moments of capital inflows are calculated using a rolling window including 12
quarters before each period to capture better the surprise element of sudden stops. For particular EM
economies, Figure 1.1 shows for illustration potential sudden stops, i.e. periods in which the annual change
in quarterly capital flows fell below the two-standard deviations band (red line).
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other indicator variables.7 The mentioned studies find evidence in favor of the hypoth-
esis that sudden stops are triggered by external factors. At the same time, however, the
results suggest that the vulnerability to a sudden stop originates in domestic structural
weaknesses. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) find that a country’s degree of openness
and domestic liability dollarization are the most important determinants of sudden stops.
Using a stylized model the authors demonstrate that the change in the real exchange rate
associated with a sudden stop is larger in the case of economies with a small tradable
goods sector. The reason for this is that an economy with a large tradable goods sector is
in a better position to adjust to the curtailment in the supply of tradable goods caused by
a sudden stop which decreases the pressures on the real exchange rate. When a large non-
tradable goods sector borrows in hard currencies (in units of tradable goods), then a real
depreciation’s balance sheet effect increases an economy’s financial burden. This process
is likely to increase concerns about the economy’s solvency triggering another round of
capital flight. The econometric analysis confirms this presumption: liability dollarization
increases the probability of a sudden stop, especially in economies with a relatively small
tradable goods sector. Eichengreen, Gupta, and Mody (2006) investigate whether external
interventions by the IMF are effective in reducing the probability of sudden stops. The
authors find evidence that sudden stops are less likely when an IMF arrangement exists,
especially in countries with strong fundamentals. This may point to the fact that IMF pro-
grams are on average effective in resolving liquidity crises and in calming down markets.
Another interesting finding is that a large stock of foreign debt relative to GDP and fixed
exchange rate arrangements increase the probability of sudden stops. Finally, Cavallo and
Frankel (2004) find that both trade openness and the current account balance over GDP
significantly decrease the probability of sudden stops. Overall, these studies confirm that
macroeconomic weaknesses such as high levels of external debt, mismatches on balance
sheets, and credibility considerations play a key role in creating a country’s vulnerability
to a sudden stop. In essence, investors’ jitters or market overreactions which lead to col-
lective capital withdrawals are more likely in countries which inhibit these vulnerabilities.
To our surprise, the level of short-term external debt relative to international reserves does
not show up significantly in the regressions. Moreover, it would be interesting to intro-
duce measures on international shocks (news about currency collapses or liquidity crises
in other EM countries) and political shocks (upcoming elections).
7The measures used are the size of current account deficit relative to the size of the traded goods sector,
imports plus exports over GDP, the degree of liability dollarization, short-term debt in total debt, M2 over
reserves, reserves over the current account deficit, a measure on the exchange rate regime, public debt over
revenues, external debt over exports, terms of trade, and regional and institutional dummies.
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1.3 Effects of sudden stops
As discussed in Section 1.2, sudden stops have affected a wide range of EM economies.
The macroeconomic outcome, however, has been different across the affected economies
ranging from mild economic recessions to widespread financial crises. The present sec-
tion investigates the macroeconomic effects of sudden stops taking into account the het-
erogeneity of affected economies.
1.3.1 Sudden stops, twin crises, and debt crises
Sudden stops in 2000-01 have been associated with currency and financial crises (twin
crises) in Argentina and Turkey (Bordo (2006)). Argentina, in addition, experienced a
sovereign debt crisis. In other economies as in Chile in 1998, or Brazil in 2002, sudden
stops involved milder economic slowdowns. An even more striking case is Australia in
1998 which as Chile was hit by an adverse terms of trade and export demand shock. Aus-
tralia, however, did not experience a sudden stop, on the contrary, Australia was able to
rely on foreign borrowing to smooth out the effects of the external shocks. In terms of
Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2004) Australia had both ’country trust’, confidence by
investors in the underlying soundness of its institutions, and ’currency trust’, confidence
in its commitment to a credible nominal anchor. As Bordo (2006) argues, Chile sent
wrong signals to the market by tightening monetary policy opposed to Australia. This
policy response seems to have increased investors’ uncertainty about the Chilean peso
and financial stability resulting in an important sudden stop. Calvo and Talvi (2005) com-
pare the Chilean and Argentine experiences with sudden stops and argue that Argentina
was more vulnerable to a full-blown crisis than Chile. They argue that this vulnerabil-
ity stemmed from Argentina’s higher liability dollarization and its smaller tradable goods
sector. The involved dynamics are reminiscent of Fisher (1933)’s Debt-Deflation argu-
ment that unanticipated price changes can have important real effects, if they increase the
stock of debt relative to income and wealth. The mechanism during a sudden stop is the
following: Initially, the economy is forced to pay down parts of its accumulated exter-
nal debt. When this debt is largely denominated in foreign currency (or in real terms in
units of tradable goods), then the economy has to transfer more foreign currency to its
lenders than expected. Given prices, this translates into an excess demand for tradable
goods, which can be converted into exports and generate foreign-currency income. This
process causes a real depreciation, i.e. an increase in the relative price of tradable and
non-tradable goods, which tends to be higher in economies with a small tradable goods
sector. To the extent that loans from abroad are denominated in units of a foreign cur-
rency, the real depreciation increases the value of liabilities relative to income, notably,
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in economies that have small parts of foreign-currency income. Thus, for a given level
of external foreign-currency debt, the adverse balance sheet effect and real depreciation
are likely to be larger in economies with small tradable goods sectors acting as amplifiers
of the initial shock. The inverse and amplifying relation between prices of income and
liabilities is what reminds to Fisher (1933)’s argument. Moreover, depending on which
sector is vulnerable, sudden stops can result in banking or sovereign debt crises. When the
banking sector is subject to balance sheet mismatches and capital withdrawals, a sudden
stop can cause a banking crisis. It can also lead to a sovereign debt (corporate debt) crisis
for governments (corporate sectors), whose debts are in foreign currency, and whose tax
revenues (income) to service the debt are in domestic currency. Both a banking and debt
crisis can trigger a currency crisis as international reserves which serve to back the bank-
ing system’s liabilities as well as the government’s balance sheet are threatened (Bordo
(2006) and Mishkin (2003)). Therefore, when the capital flow reversal is large relative
to international reserves and the size of the tradable goods sector, the real depreciation
is likely to be associated with a nominal depreciation. A controversial question in this
context is whether currency or banking crises are caused by a sudden stop or vice versa, a
problem of ’reverse causality’. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) is the single study that
investigates for a sample of EM economies whether recent sudden stops have preceded
currency devaluations or not. They find evidence that, in about 2/3 of the cases in which a
large currency depreciation was associated with a sudden stop, the sudden stop came first.
With respect to banking crises, Joyce and Nabar (2007) find that 1/3 of sudden stops were
associated with banking crises, while only 10% of all banking crises were associated with
sudden stops. Therefore, the empirical evidence suggests that sudden stops are likely to
be associated with currency crisis and to a lesser extent with banking crises. Moreover,
sudden stops are not only the concomitant of currency crises, but in the majority of cases
their cause. Overall, the discussion highlights that the subsequent economic adjustment
depends on both internal (structural weaknesses, policy response) and external factors
(lenders’ behavior).
1.3.2 Empirical findings
In the following, we summarize the results of the empirical literature on the effects of
sudden stops, based on three investigations which were conducted for large panels of
countries. In several papers, Calvo has pointed out the following empirical regulari-
ties of sudden stops (Calvo (1998b), Calvo and Talvi (2005), and Calvo (2006a)): (a)
most importantly, a sudden collapse in capital flows and sharp increase in the cost of
foreign borrowing, (b) a reversal of the current account deficit, (c) downturns of domes-
tic production and aggregate demand, (d) drops in domestic credits and investment, and
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(e) increased volatility of relative prices, asset prices, and the exchange rate. Moreover,
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006), Edwards (2005), and Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Vil-
lar (2004) examine empirically the macroeconomic effects during and in the aftermath of
sudden stops, see Table 1.3 for a summary. The mentioned studies find evidence that sud-
den stops have a strong negative impact on economic growth, and that financial factors are
important determinants of the economic effects. Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar (2004)
find that sudden stops involve declines in capital flows from 6 to 20% of GDP with an av-
erage of 13%.8 The associated average current account reversal amounts to about 10%
of GDP. Using growth regressions, the authors find that the countries’ trade openness, the
exchange rate regime, and the degree of liability dollarization are important determinants
of growth, both during and in the aftermath of sudden stops. The largest effect on output
performance has the exchange rate regime, i.e. a flexible exchange rate regime ahead of
a sudden stop contributes to improve output performance during the sudden stop by 7%
on average. Most probably, this can be explained by the fact that both borrowers and
lenders perceive a higher currency risk in flexible exchange rates regimes, which tends to
reduce unhedged foreign-currency liabilities. Moreover, lower liability dollarization and
higher trade openness reduce significantly the output costs of sudden stops. In addition,
the authors investigate which factors determine whether the associated current account ad-
justment is done via an export expansion or an import compression. They find that more
open economies experience a higher export growth and, thus, less import contraction
contrary to economies that suffer from liability dollarization. This confirms that during a
sudden stop a large tradable goods sector can benefit and improve aggregate output per-
formance. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006) investigate output collapses and recoveries
triggered by systemic sudden stops. The main findings are that output recovers on average
after about 3 years. They argue that the output drop as well as the recovery are largely
explained by total factor productivity and a sudden ’capacity under-utilization’, because
changes in employment and the capital stock appear to account only for a small part of
the variation in production. Another finding is that while domestic and external credits
drop persistently, output recovers generally fast (Phoenix Miracle). Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Talvi (2006) reason that an economy strives to develop new sources of financing its pro-
duction, which lie outside the credit market, such as postponing investment projects or
reducing divident payments. Finally, Edwards (2005) investigates whether the extent of
capital mobility affects a country’s vulnerability to a sudden stop and whether it affects
the subsequent economic adjustment. The author finds evidence that, once the sudden
stop occurs, countries with a higher capital mobility face a higher cost in terms of growth
declines. Overall, the empirical studies reveal that the structural weaknesses discussed
8In several African and Middle Eastern countries, the capital flow reversal exceeds 30% of GDP (e.g.
Kuwait 1992, Yemen 1998, Angola 2000, and Republic of Congo 1995).
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in the section on the determinants of sudden stops are equally important factors of the
economic effects of a sudden stop.
1.4 Theory of sudden stops
A growing body of literature builds theoretical models to explain the sources and trans-
mission mechanisms of sudden stops. In the following, we summarize briefly the results
of this literature from the perspective of borrowers and lenders.
1.4.1 Lenders perspective
The theoretical literature on sudden stops from the perspective of lenders relies on the
assumption of asymmetric and imperfect information on financial markets. Because in-
formation is assumed to be costly, part of the investors face a signal extraction problem
and follow a herding strategy (Calvo (1999) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000)). The idea
is similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond and Rajan (2005) who study the
mechanisms of bank runs. The difference with regard to sudden stops is that not an in-
dividual bank is affected, but rather an entire economy. The common mechanism is the
following: If an investor expects that all other investors will withdraw their funds, then
it is irrelevant whether a borrower is solvent in the long-run. Rather, the borrower will
get into liquidity problems in the short-run. The only rational response for the investor
is to withdraw his investments before the others do. The resulting liquidity run is a self-
fulfilling prophecy, since each investor’s incentive to withdraw his funds depends on what
he expects the others will do. Put it differently, if enough investors expect the others to
withdraw their funds, then all investors have an incentive to rush to be the first in the line.
1.4.2 Borrowers perspective
The conventional open economy general equilibrium models, i.e. the International Real
Business Cycle Theory (IRBC) and New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM), are
unable to explain sudden stops, because of the assumption of perfect global capital mar-
kets (Mendoza (2006b)). This assumption implies that foreign capital is available to fulfill
the financing role for households to smooth consumption, and for firms to finance produc-
tion and investment, efficiently. An implication is that an economy responds to adverse,
transitory shocks by borrowing on global capital markets to cushion the negative impact,
i.e. capital inflows increase. During sudden stops, however, economies lose their access
to global capital markets and capital inflows drop. This is at odds with the assumption
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of perfect capital markets. Those open economy models that are able to explain sudden
stops, typically, incorporate financial markets that are subject to frictions (Arellano and
Mendoza (2003), Mendoza (2006b), Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2004), or Cook and
Devereux (2005)). The theoretical models build on an amplification mechanism which
is similar to Fisher (1933)’s debt-deflation mechanism. The mechanism relates an econ-
omy’s costs (or access) of credits with the economy’s leverage (external debt relative to
domestic assets). To the extent that external debt is largely denominated in foreign cur-
rency and that a sudden stop causes a real depreciation, sudden stops imply a negative
wealth effect through the depreciation’s balance sheet effect. The drop in net wealth in-
creases in turn the economy’s leverage and, therewith, worsens the economy’s access to
external finance. This mechanism ends up in a circle of amplification and is in line with
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006):
”Sharp nominal (and real) currency devaluation in the presence of Liabil-
ity Dollarization may have worked in EMs as a new version of Fisher’s Debt
Deflation syndrome and may be central in explaining output collapses.”
Overall, the theoretical literature suggests that the scope of the involved economic
adjustment depends on the structural factors highlighted in the previous sections: the size
of the tradable goods sector, the degree of currency mismatch between an economy’s
assets and liabilities, and the level of indebtedness.
1.5 Policy challenges and options
In the previous sections, we discussed the sources and economic effects of sudden stops.
First, the evidence highlighted that particular structural weaknesses are key determinants
of both the occurrence of a sudden stop and the depth of the resulting crisis. Domestic
policy could therefore take policy steps to reduce such vulnerabilities. Second, once a
sudden stop hits, the right policy response can calm down markets.9 As sudden stops rep-
resent a curtailment in external credits and investments, there is also a potential to resolve
the crisis by a rescue loan from an international financial institution, or by restructuring
outstanding debt. Third, we have also discussed that international contagion is an impor-
tant determinant of sudden stops. In such cases, domestic policy could be complemented
by global policies, which are aimed to prevent systemic EM crisis. In the following, we
will discuss the proposed policy remedies from these perspectives.
9The debate on optimal policy responses to sudden stops is on the top agenda in Latin America as
documented by the research project ’Policies during Sudden Stops - Country Studies’ of the Inter-American
Development Bank (see Castillo and Rondan (2008), Garcia (2007), and Valdes (2007)).
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1.5.1 Crisis resolution and debt restructuring
Roubini and Setser (2004) have put together a comprehensive investigation on the resolu-
tions of financial crises in EM economies. Their primary focus lies on the policy options
involved once the crisis hits, rather than on crisis prevention policies. Essentially, there
are two options for an economy that faces an unexpected and collective curtailment in ex-
ternal credits. The first option is to demand a rescue loan from an international financial
institution, or a major government, which is large enough to cover at least those debts
that are falling due (bailouts). The IMF plays an important role in this context and is
normally the first institution which is asked for guidance and financial support in times
of distress. The second option for a crisis country is to negotiate with its creditors to
roll over short-term liabilities, or to restructure outstanding debt such as increasing its
maturity or reducing coupon payments (bail-ins). The second emergency option implies
that a country breaks its contractual promises to repay in full and on time, and it tends to
trigger a broader loss of confidence (Roubini and Setser (2004)). Recent EM crises which
involved debt restructuring are Korea, Indonesia, Russia, Brazil , Ecuador, Argentina, and
Uruguay. The crises in Russia, Ecuador, and Argentina involved a payments suspension
on external debts (Roubini and Setser (2004), Table A.3).
1.5.2 Domestic policy
As discussed in Section 1.2, misaligned fiscal and monetary policy, and poor regulation
and supervision of the corporate and banking sectors, that result in structural weaknesses
are important determinants of sudden stops. The empirical evidence highlights the major
structural weaknesses, and domestic policy should be aiming at reducing them (Calvo
(2006a) and Calvo and Talvi (2005)). Of course, policy credibility and transparency are
equally relevant in the context of sudden stops (Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns (2004) and
Dornbusch (2001)). Once a sudden stop occurs, however, it is a difficult task to find the
policy response that helps to restore confidence and to reduce adverse amplifier effects.
In the following, we discuss the options for fiscal and monetary policy.
Fiscal policy, regulation and supervision
In the following, we discuss crisis prevention policies that are aimed at reducing the in-
cidence of the structural vulnerabilities highlighted above. First, domestic policy can
discourage firms and banks to take on large amounts of debt denominated in foreign cur-
rency. This could be achieved by levying a tax on total borrowing (not only external
borrowing) denominated in foreign currency, or by introducing incentives that induce do-
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mestic banks to shift from foreign-currency indexation toward some domestic price level,
as in Chile the ’unidad de fomento’ (Calvo (2006a)). These measures would reduce both
foreign and domestic liability dollarization. Similarly, regulatory institutions can fix rules
and limits on borrowing of the private sector and punish their noncompliance. The adop-
tion of the Basel II framework is a possibility to improve existing regulatory frameworks
of financial sectors by imposing capital requirements for banks that are more closely re-
lated to their underlying risks. Second, tariff and competitiveness policies that aim at
trade opening and result in large tradable goods sectors can help to prevent a full-fledged
crisis, since tradable goods can be transformed to exports, which can serve as a source
of foreign currency (Calvo (2006a)). A controversial issue is whether capital controls on
capital inflows and/or outflows can help to prevent a sudden stop. Calvo and Talvi (2005)
demonstrate that even effective controls on capital outflows, as in Malaysia in 1997, can
not prevent a sudden stop, since it entails lower capital inflows and not necessarily capital
outflows. On the contrary, Edwards (2005) finds empirical evidence that capital controls
tend to reduce the output costs of a sudden stop (see Section 1.2.4). Once the sudden stop
hits, it is difficult to determine the right policy response, because of the difficulty to fore-
see the implied market reaction. Since the Asian crisis of 1997-98, there is a controversial
debate about the question of whether fiscal and monetary policy should be tightened (as
was recommended by the IMF) or not (Stiglitz (2002)). Calvo and Talvi (2005) argue that
fiscal policy should not further constrain aggregate demand in the short-run, especially,
when the crisis is systemic. In this case, tight fiscal policy is likely to translate into a
further unnecessary contraction in aggregate demand. If, however, tight fiscal policy im-
proves the economy’s credibility and facilitates capital market access, tightening could be
a solution. To reduce the need for a tightening of fiscal policy during times of distress,
governments could create a stabilization fund, which grows during expansions and falls
during downturns, as the Chilean Copper Stabilization Fund (Calvo and Talvi (2005)). Of
course, a problem with this type of policy is moral hazard. When the private sector antici-
pates a bailout, it possibly will change its behavior and take on excessive risks (Calvo and
Talvi (2005)). Therefore, bailouts should be made costly (Bagehot (1873)). Moreover, if
public debt is small, governments may be in a better position to improve domestic credit
conditions by borrowing at international financial institutions or governments.
Monetary policy
There is a controversial debate about the appropriate exchange rate regime for EM
economies (Calvo and Reinhart (1999), Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), Calvo
(2001), and Calvo and Mishkin (2003)). The main theme of this debate is that pegged
exchange rates tempt to increase the risk that borrowers underestimate currency risk and
20
rely too much on foreign-currency debt. Many EM economies used to peg the exchange
rate, however, with the onset of the Asian crisis a view emerged that pegged exchange
rates were part of the underlying problem (Fischer (2001)). According to this view, sev-
eral major EM economies operate nowadays under an inflation-targeting framework in
which price stability is the principal objective and a short-term interest rate the main
monetary policy instrument to achieve the announced inflation target (as in Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, and Mexico). Capital markets tend to be open and exchange rates tend to be
flexible.10 Central banks may also put some weight on exchange rate stability in their de-
cisions, especially, when an economy suffers from liability dollarization (fear of floating).
In the extreme case, EM economies may also dollarize and adopt, e.g., the US dollar as
domestic currency. Such strong pegs like the dollarization in Ecuador can help to reduce
the incidence of external shocks, especially, those that filter through the capital account
(Calvo and Reinhart (2000)). In a recent paper, Calvo (2006b) highlights that monetary
policy during a sudden stop faces a dilemma: the conflict between the objectives of price
stability and financial stability. Calvo casts doubt on the question whether price stability
should be the principal objective during a sudden stop. He argues that ’a sudden stop is,
first of all, a credit event and the economy as a whole, including the central bank and
other public institutions, experiences a sudden curtailment of international credit’. Con-
sequently, if existing, then international reserves could be made available to the public,
and central banks could take on the role of a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR).11 If in-
ternational reserves are limited, however, central bank loans would have to be financed
by seigniorage, which would interfere with a central bank’s objective of price stability,
and its ability to act as a LOLR would be restricted. To reduce this risk, a central bank
could accumulate a critical level of international reserves that can be released in times
of capital flight.12 According to Calvo the central question is in which way international
reservers should be made available, i.e. by Foreign Exchange Intervention (FXI) or by
directed credit to critical sectors. FXI has the advantage that a central bank needs to have
only limited information about the credit market participants. The disadvantage of FXI,
however, is that reserves may become capital flight and not be used in the real economy.
Calvo argues that ’if the central bank has better information than the market, it may be
advisable for the central bank to channel international reserves directly to sectors which
10In open economies, governments have to choose two out of three options: (1) independent monetary
policy, (2) free capital mobility, and (3) fixed exchange rates. So, many EM economies have chosen (1)+(2)
combined with flexible exchange rates.
11A LOLR is an institution that is able to lend at reasonable low rates of interest to sectors (private or
public) that are seriously credit constrained.
12In many EM economies, central banks have acted according to this and accumulated larger stocks
of international reserves. In Latin America, for instance, the stock of international reserves doubled with
respect to pre-crises levels, while in Asia the stock increased by a factor of three. See, for instance, Jeanne
and Ranciere (2006) on optimal levels of international reserves in EMs.
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have a positive marginal social return to the use of international reserves.’13 Again, moral
hazard is an important problem in this context, since the anticipation that a central bank
will provide rescue loans during a sudden stop, may induce the private sector to take on
excessive risks. Therefore, there should be some form of debt management regulation
that relates a firm’s financial practice during normal times with the commitment to credit
lines during sudden stops (Calvo (2006b)). An effective LOLR has, thus, a high potential
to cushion the adverse impacts of the curtailment in credits and, therewith, help to restore
confidence and bring down the capital flight. As noted in the section on fiscal policy, there
is a controversial debate about the question of whether monetary policy should be tight-
ened or not during a sudden stop.14 For instance, several Asian central banks have been
criticized to have amplified the real effects of the sudden stops by increasing interest rates,
a response which was expected to counteract the capital flight and cushion the pressures
on the domestic currency. According to many researches, this response was ineffective,
since the capital flight continued and currencies collapsed. In driving up costs of domes-
tic finance, high domestic interest rates worsen the effects of a credit crunch. Thus, it
may be advisable to decrease domestic interest rates in order to improve domestic credit
conditions and to calm down the market.
1.5.3 Global policy
As discussed before, domestic policy can help to prevent sudden stops, especially, when
it is based on sound and credible institutions. When a sudden stop has a systemic com-
ponent, however, domestic policy should be complemented by policies that are aimed at
the global capital market (Calvo (2006a), Calvo and Talvi (2005), and Calvo (2002)). In
his recent work, Calvo repeatedly encourages the international community to create an
EM Fund (EMF) that complements the work of international institutions like the IMF in
the resolution of liquidity crises. Calvo suggests that an EMF should not target individual
countries as the IMF, but rather individual financial intermediaries that suffer from unex-
pected liquidity shortages. The strategy of an EMF would be similar to that of a central
bank that faces a bank run: liquidity is provided to banks directly and not to the bank’s
individual debtors (Calvo (2006a)). Again, moral hazard constitutes a problem in this con-
text. The creation of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) in 2003, which is managed by the Bank
of International Settlements and funded by the members’ governments, is an example of
an attempt to build up a regional LOLR. Equally important would be to foster the devel-
13A successful example of directed allocation of international reserves during a sudden stop is Brazil in
2002, when the central bank employed international reserves to make loans to the export sector intermedi-
ated through commercial banks.
14Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2004) develop a general equilibrium model to analyze optimal interest
rate responses to a sudden stop.
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opment of international bond markets and financial instruments, which allow for a more
efficient international risk sharing and move away from the mere dollar-indexation of debt
instruments (Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2002)). Moreover, international coor-
dination of monetary policy can play an important role in preventing global and systemic
shocks. As Calvo and Talvi (2005) argue, a global liquidity shortage that wipes out to
EM economies may be attenuated, when the central banks in major economies decrease
interest rates, as eventually happened in response to the Russian crisis.
1.6 Contributions of this dissertation
In the previous sections, we have discussed the sudden stop phenomenon and presented
evidence that many of the recent, major EM crises involved a sudden stop of capital in-
flows. In our work on EM crises, we set therefore a particular focus on those crises that
originate in international capital markets. We have highlighted that particular structural
weaknesses of economies are important causes of sudden stops, and EM crises, and that
these weaknesses act as amplifiers of adverse shocks. The existing literature points to the
importance of the structure of an economy’s income and liabilities and, thus, as pointed
out by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) ’when analyzing sudden stops, careful consid-
eration should be given to financial vulnerabilities to external shocks’. Ultimately, these
vulnerabilities are generated at the micro-level and can best be analyzed by the use of
firm- or bank-level data. As Roubini and Setser (2004) point out ’balance sheet analysis
is particularly helpful for understanding the dynamics of crisis. It explains both how a
crisis in one sector of the economy can snowball and lead to a broader crisis and how
financial weaknesses (...) interact in a dynamic way with policy weaknesses as stress
mounts’. In the first two essays of this dissertation, we have put together cross-country
datasets with information on annual and quarterly financial statements of many individual
banks and firms. We believe that our data brings more detailed information to under-
stand the dynamics of EM crises, than data on the macro-level, which is usually consid-
ered. Moreover, our data allows a greater exploration of the relationships between firm
and bank characteristics and macroeconomic dynamics. While the first essay ”Sudden
Stops and Bank Lending” focuses on the determinants of domestic bank lending during
sudden stops, the second essay ”Currency Depreciations, Financial Transfers, and Firm
Heterogeneity” analyzes distributive aspects of currency collapses from the perspective
of firms. In both empirical studies, we find evidence for a high degree of heterogeneity
at the micro-level, essentially, arising from capital mismatches in the case of banks, and
from currency mismatches in the case of firms. In the second essay, we complement the
empirical analysis with the development of a micro-founded, dynamic model of a repre-
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sentative firm, to explore the effects of currency collapses on firm dynamics and income
distribution, in presence of currency mismatches. In the final essay ”International Finan-
cial Shocks in Emerging Market Economies”, we develop a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model to explore the transmission and amplification mechanisms of external
financial shocks in an open economy context. The three essays address particularly im-
portant aspects of EM crises. To our knowledge, our investigation on banks and sudden
stops is the first attempt to explore the determinants of bank lending during sudden stops
using bank-level data. Moreover, our study of currency collapses and income distribution
between firms and lenders is one of the few existing attempts, to shed light on the distribu-
tive dimensions of currency crises using firm-level data. And finally, we have developed a
general equilibrium model that helps to explore financial crises and financial amplifier ef-
fects in EM economies. The relevance of this study can be confirmed by Calvo and Talvi
(2005), who note that ’unfortunately, false starts and painful crashes have not given rise
to a solid academic literature comparable to the one dealing with problems in the North.
(...) Thus, we strongly believe that a deeper understanding of financial crises in the region
constitutes one of the most productive projects.’
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1.7 Appendix
Table 1.1: Dates of sudden stops
Latin Americaa Asia Others
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Mexico 1995 Singapore 1994 Portugal 1992
Argentina 1995 Thailand 1996 Spain 1992
Venezuela 1995 Japan 1997 Sweden 1992
Costa Rica 1996 Korea 1997 Turkey 1995
Peru 1997 Malaysia 1997 Czech Republic 1996
Argentina 1998 Philippines 1997 Greece 1997
Chile 1998 Indonesia 1997 India 1997
Colombia 1998 Singapore 2001 Israel 1998
Bolivia 1999 New Zealand 1998
Ecuador 1999 Turkey 1998
Argentina 2001 Turkey 2001
Brazil 2002
Bolivia 2002
Paraguay 2002
Uruguay 2002
a The particular dates are taken from Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004), Eichengreen, Gupta,
and Mody (2006), Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar (2004), and Cavallo and Frankel (2004).
Sudden stops in Africa are not considered. Note that bold letter indicate sudden stops that
seem to have involved international contagion.
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Table 1.2: Literature on the determinants of sudden stops
Authors Sample Methodology Target variables Results
Calvo, 32 countries Logit Model 1) Domestic liability DLD and trade closeness increase
Izquierdo, and 1990-2001 dollarization (DLD) the probability of sudden stops.
Mejia (2004) Dependent
variable: 2) One minus the degree The combination of high DLD and low
Sudden stop of trade openness (measures trade openness is dangerous.
dummy sensitivity of the real exchange
rate to capital flows reversals)
Controls: exchange rate regime,
reserves over current account deficit
(CAD), credit growth, foreign direct
investment (FDI), fiscal balance,
terms of trade growth, public sector debt
Frankel and 141 countries Probit model 1) Trade openness Openness decreases and CAD/GDP
Cavallo (2004) 1970-2002 increases the probability
Dependent 2) Foreign debt over GDP of sudden stops.
variable:
Sudden stop 3) CAD/GDP The level of foreign debt over GDP is
dummy not significant.
Controls: GDP per capita,
gov. budget over GDP, FDI/GDP
short-term debt over total debt, and
exchange rate regime
Eichengreen, 24 countries Probit model 1) Trade openness IMF programs decrease and the
Gupta, and 1980-2003 level of foreign debt over GDP
Mody (2006) Dependent 2) Foreign debt over GDP increase the probability of sudden stops.
variable:
Sudden stop 3) New (existing) IMF program Openness has no significant impact.
dummy
Controls: High yield spread, change
in oil prices, GDP growth,
debt servicing over exports,
domestic credit over GDP
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Table 1.3: Literature on the effects of sudden stops
Authors Sample Methodology Target variables Results
Calvo, 32 countries Difference in 1) Total factor productivity (TFP) Output recovers without recovery
Izquierdo, and 1980-2004 means test: in domestic and foreign credits
Talvi (2007) precrisis, trough 2) Investment/GDP (Phoenix miracle)
and recovery
3) Credits/GDP Investment recovers very slowly.
Firms delay investment project to
4) Current account/GDP restore liquidity.
Financial factors are prominant
in explaining the output collapse.
Guidotti, 150 countries Pooled 1) Trade openness Lower financial dollarization
Sturzenegger, 1974-2002 regression and higher trade openness reduce
and Villar (2004) 2) Financial dollarization output costs of sudden stops.
Dependent
variable: Controls: change in terms of Flexible exchange rates improve
GDP, export trade (ToT), exchange rate regime, output performance during
and import size of capital acoount contraction, sudden stops.
growth growth of world exports
More open economies experience
higher export growth and lower
import contraction.
Edwards (2005) 157 countries Pooled 1) Currency crisis dummy Currency crises and current account
1970-2000 regression reversals have an adverse impact
2) Current account reversal dummy on growth.
Dependent
variable: 3) Sudden stop dummy (interaction Sudden stops have a stronger,
GDP per capita between 1) and 2)) but short lived, adverse
growth impact on growth.
Controls: change in ToT,
growth gap (difference between
long-run and current growth rate
of GDP per capita)
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Figure 1.1: Annual changes in quarterly capital flows
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Chapter 2
Sudden Stops and Bank Lending
Michael Brei 1
Using annual financial statements of individual banks operating in 11 countries in Asia
and Latin America, we investigate whether a strong domestic banking system and foreign
bank participation help to insulate emerging market economies from the adverse effects
of sudden stops by stabilizing the domestic credit supply. We use measures for bank
size, asset liquidity, capitalization, currency mismatch, and the origin of the majority
shareholder to identify the key determinants of domestic bank lending during sudden
stops.
In most cases, we find that sudden stops are associated with reductions in the domestic
lending volume in the order of 10-15% of GDP. Moreover, banking sectors with higher
capitalization and foreign bank presence tend to attenuate the adverse effects of sudden
stops on the domestic lending volume and strengthen, therewith, the affected economies.
Keywords: Sudden stop, international capital markets
JEL Classification: F34, F36, G21
1Bonn Graduate School of Economics, e-mail: michael.brei@uni-bonn.de. I would like to thank Jo¨rg
Breitung, Matthieu Charpe, Valeriya Dinger, Ju¨rgen von Hagen, Michael Schober, and the participants of
the 8th SALISES conference in Trinidad (2007) and the LFN conference in Bogota (2007) for their useful
comments and suggestions. The remaining errors are mine.
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2.1 Introduction
In a sudden stop episode, an economy that has been the recipient of capital inflows, stops
receiving such inflows and instead faces unexpected withdrawals of investments and the
inability to roll over existing debt that is falling due. Most of the considered episodes
in this paper exhibited elements of a self-fulfilling crisis in which capital withdrawals
by some key investors resulted in a financial panic and unnecessarily deep recessions
affecting particular regions entirely.
Goldfajn (2001) states with regard to sudden stops:
’I define a sudden stop as a very large change in the supply of capital.
Of course, this sudden stop is always in the negative direction. There are also
problems with big booms of capital inflows in the sense that you need to know
what you are doing with the big influx. But the real problem is when you get
billions of dollars less from one year to the other - on the order of 10 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP) or so. And most of the countries that had
crises faced this challenge: Mexico, Asia, Turkey, Brazil, all of them.’
The particular outcome of the unexpected capital flight can be manifold ranging from
outright default, a rescheduling of debt payments, to bank runs, or to a rescue by a lender
who provides new loans. The strength of the economic adjustment depends ultimately on
several factors including, amongst others, the economy’s foreign exposure, its degree of
balance sheet mismatches and monetary policy. The banking sector plays a key role in
determining the ability of an economy to attenuate the negative impact of sudden stops.
Banks can cushion the impact, when they are in the position to grant additional loans to
those sectors that found their credits cut. When banks themselves are in trouble, however,
banks can even be forced to cut down lending and amplify the initial shock.
The present paper investigates recent sudden stop episodes from the perspective of
individual banks that operate in the affected economies. Using information on annual
financial statements, we address the question of whether and in which way banks are
affected with a focus on bank lending. In particular, we explore a dataset for the period
1992-2004 comprising 507 banks in 11 Asian and Latin American countries and test for
cross-sectional differences in the responses of banks to a total of 14 sudden stop episodes.
To distinguish between banks with different financial positions and characteristics, we
use measures for bank size, asset liquidity, capitalization, currency mismatch, and the
origin of the majority shareholder. The following hypothesis is tested: A sudden stop has
a disproportionately large and negative impact on the lending volume of small, domestic
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banks with vulnerable balance sheets.2
Recent literature on sudden stops highlights the importance of the capital, maturity,
and currency composition of balance sheets. According to this literature, sudden stops are
often triggered by investors’ uncertainty about the credit worthiness of the balance sheet
of a significant part of the economy. A currency depreciation, in a mismatch situation,
works as a new version of Fisher (1933)’s debt-deflation mechanism and increases the
prospect of insolvency and, hence, the capital flight. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006)
argue that currency depreciations in the presence of currency mismatches are central in
explaining the observed output collapses during sudden stops. Sudden stops are often
associated with large currency depreciations which, in the case of a currency mismatch,
increase the local currency value of outstanding debt relative to income and assets. The
associated reduction in net wealth which is used as a collateral in debt contracts increases
in turn the cost of external finance and sets in motion an amplifying mechanism that is
similar to the well-known debt-deflation mechanism. When the banking sector is subject
to important currency mismatches, this mechanism can contribute to a banking crisis as
the collateral backing bank loans deteriorates. Most of the existing literature, however,
focuses on currency mismatches from the perspective of firms.3
A growing body of literature analyzes the relation between bank capital and bank
lending. Bernanke, Lown, and Friedman (1991) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004)
find that bank capital is an important determinant of the propagation of different types of
shocks to lending. Bernanke, Lown, and Friedman (1991), for instance, find that poorly-
capitalized banks contracted their lending volume by more than well-capitalized banks
during the U.S. recession in 1990. Bank capital can affect bank lending in several ways.
On the one hand, bank capital tends to increase the capacity to raise non-deposit fund-
ing, because it gives investors signals about the bank’s creditworthiness and serves as a
collateral in debt contracts. Moreover, usually banks have to meet regulatory capital re-
quirements that are linked to lending (as recommended in the Basel Accord). In such an
environment, banks can be forced to reduce lending in order to meet the capital require-
ments, given equity issuance is restricted and bank capital falls below the minimal capital
requirement, be it, because of a drop in income or an adverse balance sheet effect.
Another strand of literature examines the impact of the rising foreign bank presence in
emerging market economies on the banking sectors in the host countries.4 The main theme
of this literature is that foreign banks tend to improve a banking sector’s efficiency and
2A bank is vulnerable when it is highly leveraged, especially, when the bank finances a domestic-
currency denominated, illiquid asset portfolio with foreign-currency denominated, short-term debt.
3See Galindo, Panizza, and Schiantarelli (2003) for an overview of the empirical evidence.
4See Clarke, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez (2003) for an overview of this literature.
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stability.5 The main argument is that foreign banks, through their global scope and higher
diversification, tend to have lower default risks and lower funding costs, and to be less
vulnerable to adverse financial shocks in a particular country since they are likely to have
better access to foreign capital than domestic banks. Arena, Reinhart, and Vazquez (2006)
find evidence that the lending and deposit volume of foreign banks in emerging market
economies is less affected during financial crises than that of their domestic competitors.
Peek and Rosengren (2000) find that many foreign banks in Latin America did not reduce
their credit supply during economic recessions in the host country. More precisely, they
argue that foreign banks view such situations as opportunities to expand by acquisition or
by increasing funding to existing subsidiaries.
The present paper focuses on related issues, however, its specific contribution is the
focus on bank lending in the context of a sudden stop, one of the most important sources
of instability in emerging market economies. In particular, we find that both the lending
and deposit volume in US$ decline on average by 15-30% during sudden stops, and de-
posits recover more quickly than loans. Interestingly, lending of well-capitalized banks is
significantly less affected during sudden stops, especially when sudden stops are associ-
ated with large currency depreciations. This finding indicates that bank capital increases
the banks’ ability to cushion the effect on lending of, be it, an adverse income shock, an
adverse balance sheet effect, or deposit withdrawals. In the case of foreign banks, we
reach similar results indicating that foreign banks contribute to stabilize domestic bank
lending in times of sudden stops. The findings suggest that banking sectors with higher
capitalization and higher foreign bank presence are less prone to sudden stops which are
associated with drops in domestic bank lending. Our findings also suggest that bank size,
maturity and currency mismatches on the banks’ balance sheets are of second order im-
portance, once bank capital and foreign ownership are taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we present a
structural description of the adjustment mechanism within the banking sector in response
to a sudden stop. In Section 2.3, we describe the underlying dataset and present the
empirical results. The final section concludes.
2.2 Sudden stops and the banking sector
When foreign investors collectively refuse to roll-over existing debt and withdraw invest-
ments, both the private and public sector in the affected economy may be involved but not
all parts to the same degree. Initially, particular sectors face an unexpected curtailment
5See, amongst others, Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001), Martinez Peria and Mody
(2004), and Dages, Goldberg, and Kinney (2000).
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in foreign funds, later, increasing capital flight and effects on aggregate demand, prices,
interest rates, and exchange rates affect the whole economy. As there are few papers on
the effects of a sudden stop on banks, we discuss in the following the involved adjustment
mechanism.6
2.2.1 Initial shocks
A critical mass of foreign investors reduces its exposure to the economy and cuts down
credits and investments. Particular domestic investors are likely to follow. The capital
flight translates for particular banks into a drop in external funds of short maturity such as
particular bonds, credits and deposits.
2.2.2 Subsequent effects
The impact on individual banks depends ultimately on the bank’s initial portfolio struc-
ture as well as on its costumers. The unexpected inability to roll over maturing and short-
term debt can result in liquidity problems, especially when too much assets are long-term
and entail large costs in the case of liquidation (maturity mismatch). The restricted ac-
cess to global capital markets is likely to cause an overall increase in the costs of external
finance, since the affected banks and firms increase their demand for domestic funds to
smooth out the adverse shock. In addition, the risky environment causes on average a
higher risk premium on external finance. On top, the deterioration in economic condi-
tions leads to an increased credit default risk from the part of the banks’ customers. A
sudden stop is often associated with a large currency depreciation which, in a mismatch
situation, increases the local-currency value of liabilities relative to local-currency assets
and reduces equity (currency mismatch). Since equity usually serves as a collateral in
debt contracts, the currency depreciation is likely to increase a bank’s costs of external
finance. Adverse balance sheet effects are likely to increase the prospect of insolvency,
and concerned depositors may demand the bank for the disbursement of their deposits.
In particular cases, this can result in severe liquidity problems and trigger a bank run.
Moreover, shifts of deposits toward banks with a sounder financial structure or a better
reputation can occur.
Several factors determine to which degree a banking sector is affected by a sudden
stop, most importantly: (1) bank regulation prior to the sudden stop such as reserve, cap-
6A theoretical investigation on a related issue, i.e. on liquidity shortages of banks, is that of Diamond
and Rajan (2005). The only empirical paper that focuses on sudden stops and banking crises is that of Joyce
and Nabar (2007).
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ital, and liquidity requirements that result in sound and reliable banking sectors; (2) the
banking sector’s average portfolio structure such as equity and liquid assets in excess
of the minimal requirement, and the currency and maturity composition of the average
balance sheet; and (3) a strong central bank can act as a lender of last resort during sud-
den stops and increase credits to particular banks at reasonable prices, improve domestic
financial conditions, and reallocate liquidity within the banking sector.7
To underline the difficulties that a banking sector can face during a sudden stop, the
statement of the IMF (1998) with respect to the situation in Indonesia is quoted:
’Following the closure of 16 insolvent banks in November last year, cus-
tomers concerned about the safety of private banks have been shifting size-
able amounts of deposits to state and foreign banks, while some have been
withdrawing funds from the banking system entirely... By mid November, a
large number of banks was facing growing liquidity shortages, and were un-
able to obtain sufficient funds in the interbank market to cover this gap, even
after paying interest rates ranging up to 75 percent. At the same time, another
smaller group of banks [that is state and foreign owned banks] were becom-
ing increasingly liquid, and were trading among themselves at a relatively
low JIBOR (Jakarta Interbank Offer Rate) of about 15 percent (...) the Bank
Indonesia was compelled to act. It provided banks in distress with liquidity
support, while withdrawing funds from banks with excess liquidity.’
2.2.3 Banks’ responses
Banks can sell liquid assets which is probably the cheapest alternative to meet the demand
for the repayment of external funds and make up the increase in the cost of external
finance. Alternatively, banks can attract new depositors or demand additional non-deposit
funding on the interbank market or at the central bank. In this context, the central bank
plays an important role, because it can act as the lender of last resort and allocate resources
to the affected banks. Foreign-owned banks can demand additional resources from their
parent banks. Banks can also do a recapitalization and issue additional equity. During
sudden stops, however, only a few possibilities are a feasible option since in many cases
banks have to deal with deposit withdrawals and tense situations on bond, interbank and
7An example of directed credit during a sudden stop is Brazil in 2002, when the central bank employed
parts of its international reserves to make loans to the export sector through commercial banks. The Peruvian
central bank increased banks’ liquidity during the sudden stop in 1998 by introducing dollar credit facilities
to banks and by reducing the reserve requirement of dollar deposits. In 1998, the Indonesian central bank
provided banks in distress with liquidity support, while withdrawing funds from banks with excess liquidity.
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stock markets. When banks are in trouble, they can even be forced to securitize and sell
parts of their outstanding loans or to call outstanding loans before maturity.
The lending volume of banks can be affected through several channels, most impor-
tantly: (1) adverse shocks to the cost of external finance or withdrawals of deposits reduce
a bank’s ability to make additional loans; (2) adverse balance sheet effects reduce a bank’s
equity and may push the bank below the limit of its minimal capital requirement and re-
duce its ability to grant new loans given equity issuance is restricted; and (3) increases in
the amount of non-performing loans reduce a bank’s equity and restrict its ability to make
additional loans.
The considerations above provide several testable hypotheses. The hypothesis tested
in this paper is that the lending volume of large, well-capitalized and foreign banks, and
that of banks with balance sheets that are not subject to maturity and currency mismatches,
is less affected by a sudden stop than that of banks with the opposed characteristics. There
are several reasons for this presumption: this group of banks may have a better reputation
and, therewith, a more stable deposit base and better access to other forms of external
finance; a binding capital constraint is less likely for well-capitalized banks; liquid banks
are not subject to maturity mismatches and can build on a larger, better accessible stock
of assets; foreign parent banks can allocate additional capital to their subsidiaries; and
banks without a currency mismatch are not subject to adverse balance sheet effects.
2.3 Empirical results
The bank-level data comes from BankScope and the macroeconomic data from Interna-
tional Financial Statistics.8 The unbalanced dataset covers the period from 1992 to 2004
and 11 countries from Latin America (LA-6) and Asia (A-5).9 Overall, we have informa-
tion on annual financial statements of 507 individual banks that add up to about 5600 bank
observations distributed across countries as shown in Table 2.1. On average the banking
sectors consist of 45 banks, most banks have been operating in Argentina, Indonesia and
Malaysia.
We follow Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) and identify a sudden stop episode
by the following three criteria: (1) the episode includes at least one observation where
the year-to-year fall in quarterly (net) capital inflows lies at least two standard deviations
below its sample mean; (2) the sudden stop episode begins (ends) when the year-to-year
8A more detailed data description is given in Appendix 2.5.
9LA-6 includes Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, while A-5 includes Indonesia,
South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
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fall (rise) in capital inflows falls (rises above) one standard deviation below its sample
mean; and (3) there is an associated output contraction.10
The particular dates and durations of the identified sudden stops are reported in Ta-
ble 2.1. Argentina and Bolivia appear to be most vulnerable to sudden stops, both experi-
enced a sudden stop more than once. The duration differs remarkably, the longer lasting
sudden stops occurred in Argentina 1998, Uruguay, the Philippines and Thailand. Note
also that the considered sudden stops bunch together, especially in the Asian region dur-
ing the crises years of 1997-98 pointing to international contagion effects. The average
reversal in capital inflows amounts to 8% of GDP being highest in Argentina 2001-02,
Uruguay, and Thailand, see Figure 2.1.
BankScope provides information on bank history, bank specialization, foreign share-
holders, and the balance sheet and income statements. A shortcoming is that there is no
currency decomposition and in most cases no maturity decomposition of loans, deposits
and non-deposit funding. BankScope reports consolidated and unconsolidated financial
statements, here, we use unconsolidated figures to the extent possible to reduce variations
arising from changes in a subsidiary’s ownership and to work with comparable accounting
data. The majority of banks reports the financial statement at the end of year, others report
in March, June or September.11 Central banks and observations for which the growth rate
of particular balance sheet positions (loans, deposits and total assets) exceeds 300% in
absolute terms are excluded from the sample.
Figure 2.2 shows over time the sum of bank loans for each country divided by GDP.
In A-5, bank loans are on average more important reaching 150% in Malaysia and 100%
in Korea as opposed to less than 60% in most Latin American countries. This highlights
that the domestic leverage in A-5 is far greater than in LA-6. In most cases, our sample
of banks represents about 80-90% of total domestic bank credit published in the IFS
database. An interesting finding is that most of the sudden stops are associated with a
drop in aggregate bank loans over GDP by 10-15% recovering after 3-5 years. Exceptions
are Bolivia, Indonesia and Thailand where bank lending decreases permanently.
Figure 2.3 shows average capital inflows as a share of GDP and the dollar value of
average loans and deposits per region over time. Interestingly, most of the systemic sud-
den stops, i.e. those that occurred during the period 1994-95 and 2001-02 in LA-6 and
those of 1997-98 in A-5, are associated with sharp contractions in the average lending
10The first and second moments of capital inflows are calculated using a rolling window including the 12
previous quarters of each period to capture better the surprise element of sudden stops.
11For the econometric investigation, macroeconomic variables are assigned to individual banks taking
this into account by using annualized quarterly data to the extent possible. Equally, a bank-specific dummy
variable is constructed that equals to 1 during a sudden stop period and 0 elsewhere. In addition, we required
that the sudden stop lasted at least 2 quarters of the associated financial year.
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and deposit volume ranging from 15-30%. Deposits recover in most cases after 1-2 years
more rapidly than loans which take 3-5 years to come back to their level prior to the sud-
den stop. In both regions, the difference between deposits and loans becomes larger since
1997-98. On the one hand, this finding may be explained by supply-side factors such as
banks’ diminished capacity or increased unwilligness to lend. Several countries in these
regions imposed risk-based capital requirements (Basel Accord) at that time which may
have caused banks to shift their asset composition away from loans towards assets with
a lower risk weight.12 On the other hand, this finding may be driven by a fall in loan
demand which could be triggered by the slowdown in economic activity.
To distinguish between banks with different financial positions and characteristics, we
use measures for bank size, asset liquidity, capitalization, currency mismatch, and foreign
ownership. The size of an individual bank in a given year and country is measured by
the ratio of a bank’s total assets to the country average of total assets in a given year.
Asset liquidity is measured by the ratio of the sum of cash holdings, deposits with banks,
and trading securities over total assets, and capitalization by the ratio of total equity over
total assets. A dummy variable that identifies foreign banks is constructed based on the
BankScope information on the origin of the majority shareholders. More specifically, a
bank is categorized as a foreign bank, when a foreign parent company owns at least 50%
of a bank’s equity. As mentioned, there is no direct measure for the currency composi-
tion of assets and liabilities, and we construct a rough measure based on the following
relationship: a difference between net income and the change in equity which is close to
the associated currency depreciation times total liabilities indicates a full currency mis-
match.13 To calculate the measure of currency mismatch, we consider all periods with
currency depreciations that are larger than 10% and classify a bank as one with an impor-
tant currency mismatch when the difference between net income and the change in equity
lies in the interval between 0.5 and 1 times the product of the currency depreciation and
total liabilities.
Differences in the average structure of the banking sectors in LA-6 and A-5 are high-
lighted in Figure 2.4, which shows over time the average bank size in terms of total assets
in US$, liquidity, capitalization, and the share of foreign bank assets in total assets. Firstly,
the banks that operate in A-5 are larger on average than the Latin American banks with
12For the case of Latin America, see Barajas, Chami, and Cosimano (2005).
13Consider the example of a full currency mismatch: a bank grants all loans L in domestic currency and
finances them with dollar debt D. Abstracting from other assets and external funds, the balance sheet in
domestic currency can be written as L = eD + E, where e denotes the exchange rate and E equity. The
resource constraint is given by L˙ = Π + eD˙, where Π denotes net income and x˙ a change in x. Total
differentiating the balance sheet identity and using the resource constraint leads to e˙D = Π − E˙, i.e. the
adverse stock effect due to a depreciation can be measured by the difference of net income and the change
in equity.
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an increasing trend. The largest banks operate in the largest economies Korea and Mex-
ico. For instance, the average Korean bank is more than 10 times larger than the average
bank in Bolivia, Chile, Peru and Uruguay. In Table 2.2 are listed the 12 largest banks of
each region, interestingly the 6 largest banks operate in Korea. Moreover, 9 out of the
largest banks are owned by a foreign parent company. Average liquidity evolves similarly
over time in the two regions rising from 16-18% in 1993 to 18-20% in 2002. In LA-6,
banks from Bolivia and Uruguay hold on average less liquid assets (10%) than the other
Latin American banks, while in A-5 this is the case in Indonesia and Thailand (15%).
Average capitalization is increasing over time in both regions and higher in LA-6 than in
A-5 reaching 23% and 19% in 2002, respectively. In Bolivia, Peru, Korea and Thailand,
banks’ average capitalization is lowest ranging from 10 − 15% over the whole sample.
Finally, foreign bank participation is far greater in LA-6 (30%) than in A-5 (10%) and in-
creasing over time. The market share of foreign banks in 2002 exceeds 50% in Argentina,
Bolivia, Mexico and Peru. About 75% of foreign banks in LA-6 come from Spain and the
United States, while the largest share of foreign banks in A-5 comes from Japan.
To test statistically for cross-sectional differences in the response of bank lending to
sudden stops, the following fixed effects regression is estimated:
Li,c,t = αi + βXc,t + γZi,c,t + δd
ss
i,c,t (2.1)
+ β∗Xc,tdssi,c,t + γ
∗Zi,c,tdssi,c,t + ui,c,t,
where i = 1, ..., N refers to individual banks, c = 1, ..., C to countries and t = 1, ..., Ti
to the time dimension. The dependent variable Li,c,t denotes a bank’s growth rate of real
total loans (net of problem loans) and αi bank-level fixed effects. The country-specific
variables Xc,t control for changes in economic and financial conditions.14 The bank-
specific variables Zi,c,t include the measures for bank size, asset liquidity, capitalization,
currency mismatch and foreign ownership.15 The sudden stop dummy variable is denoted
by dssi,c,t. Both the country- and bank-specific variables are interacted with the sudden stop
dummy. The key issue is interpreting the coefficients γ∗. For instance, if we find after
controlling for other bank characteristics that well-capitalized banks increase their real
lending volume by more than poorly-capitalized banks, then the associated coefficient in
the vector γ∗ should be significantly larger than zero.
14In the estimations, we include real GDP growth, the real domestic money market rate, and a real
’international’ interest rate (proxied by the federal funds rate). To control for changes in the domestic
value of the lending volume caused by currency depreciations (due to the fact that parts of debt may be
denominated in foreign currency), the period’s currency depreciation is included.
15Due to potential endogeneity problems which would lead to inconsistent OLS estimates, three of these
measures enter the regression with one lag. To be more precise, with regard to the size category there is
a possible joint determination since a bank may become larger, precisely, because of a large loan growth.
Similar problems arise with capitalization and asset liquidity.
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Table 2.3 shows the estimation results for LA-6 and Table 2.4 for A-5. Three different
specifications are considered: (1) all mentioned variables enter the regression except for
the currency depreciation and the measure for currency mismatch; (2) specification (1) is
augmented by the currency depreciation; and (3) all variables are included. First of all, the
target coefficients γ∗ and δ are largely robust across the three specifications. Other things
equal, sudden stops are associated with a significant reduction in loan growth by 11% in
LA-6 and 35% in A-5 after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and bank-specific
characteristics. In the case of Latin American banks, we find evidence for significant
cross-sectional differences. Other things equal, a 1% higher capitalization is on average
associated with 0.6% higher loan growth during sudden stops. Given capitalization, for-
eign banks have a 12% higher loan growth rate during sudden stops than domestic banks.
In the case of Asian banks, we reach the same conclusion with respect to foreign banks.
Their loan growth is on average 14% higher than that of domestic banks during sudden
stops. We find no evidence that asset liquidity, bank size, and currency mismatch are
significant determinants of lending during sudden stops. During tranquil times, the co-
efficients associated with liquidity and capitalization are significantly positive in the two
regions. Given the size of a domestic bank, loan growth is higher with higher levels of
capitalization and liquidity. The coefficient associated with the size category is in both
cases significantly negative indicating that the lending volume of larger banks grows less
than that of small banks during tranquil times.
The same regressions are estimated for two distinct types of sudden stops, namely,
those that are associated with major currency depreciations and those that are not.16 Ta-
ble 2.5 shows the results for the sudden stops associated with major currency deprecia-
tions, and Table 2.6 shows the results for the remaining sudden stops. On average and
other things equal, the reduction of loan growth during sudden stops is 3 times higher
when there is an associated currency depreciation. Interestingly, we find in all specifica-
tions that loan growth of well-capitalized banks is significantly higher than that of poorly-
capitalized banks given other things are equal. Foreign banks increase their lending vol-
ume significantly more than domestic banks, only, when sudden stops are not associated
with large currency depreciations.
A similar investigation is conducted for the real growth rate of deposits and equity.
The estimation results for specification (2) per region are shown in Table 2.7.17 Interest-
ingly, in both regions foreign banks have a significantly higher growth rate of deposits
during sudden stops than domestic banks, notably, after controlling for the currency de-
preciation. In A-5, we find similar results in the case of well-capitalized banks. More
16The sudden stops associated with major currency depreciations (> 30%) are those in Mexico, Thailand,
Indonesia, Uruguay, the Philippines, Malaysia and Korea.
17Note that the previous results obtained for loan growth are reproduced in the first column.
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specifically, a 1% high capitalization implies a 1.3% higher growth rate of deposits during
sudden stops given other things are equal. Both findings may be explained by ’reputation
effects’, which resulted in a more stable deposit base and explain why well-capitalized
banks had a higher loan growth during sudden stops.
2.4 Conclusion
In the present paper, we test for cross-sectional differences in the way domestic bank
lending is affected during sudden stops. As motivated in Section 2.2, the lending volume
of large, liquid, well-capitalized, and foreign banks, and that of banks without a currency
mismatch, is likely be less affected by a sudden stop than that of banks with the opposite
features.
Our empirical investigation reached a few results that are worth summarizing. For
the banking sectors as a whole, we find evidence that sudden stops are associated with
contractions in the domestic lending volume in the order of 10-15% of GDP. Moreover,
we find evidence that well-capitalized and foreign banks increase their lending volume
relative to the other banks. In addition, we find evidence that this finding is partly due
to the fact that these banks had on average a more stable deposit base during sudden
stops than the other banks. Therefore, banking sectors with higher capitalization and
foreign bank presence tend to attenuate the adverse effects of sudden stops on the domestic
lending volume and strengthen, therewith, the affected economies. Our findings also
suggest that bank size, maturity, and currency mismatches are of second order importance,
once bank capital and foreign ownership are taken into account.
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2.5 Appendix
Data:
Bank-level data comes from Fitch IBCA/Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database,
versions 2002 and 2004. Macroeconomic data comes from International Financial
Statistics, International Monetary Fund, version 2006. The included variables are: GDP
(series 99B), GDP deflator (series 99BIP), money market rate (series 60B)18, financial ac-
count (series 78BJD), consumer price index (series 64ZF), federal funds rate (series 60B),
and the market exchange rate (series RF)
18For the countries Bolivia, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay deposit rates (series 60L) were used instead, be-
cause of missing information on money market rates. Real interest rates were calculated by the difference
in nominal interest rates and CPI inflation.
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Table 2.1: Overview of the dataset and sudden stop episodes per country
Country Bank Av. number Average Sudden stops
year of banks no. of obs. of capital inflowsa
obs. per bank
Argentina 1151 106 11 Q4/94-Q1/95
Q2/98-Q3/99
Q4/00-Q3/01
Bolivia 177 14 13 Q2/99-Q3/99
Q4/02-Q3/03
Chile 378 32 11 Q1/98-Q4/98
Mexico 486 47 10 Q4/94-Q1/95
Peru 270 32 8 Q3/97-Q1/98
Uruguay 280 38 7 Q2/02-Q3/03
Indonesia 860 66 13 Q3/97-Q1/98
Korea 454 35 13 Q3/97-Q1/98
Malaysia 738 63 12 Q3/97-Q1/98
Philippines 447 43 10 Q3/97-Q3/98
Thailand 412 31 13 Q2/96-Q4/97
Sum/average∗ 5653 507 11∗ 14
a The sample period is 1992 to 2004. Sudden stops of capital inflows are identified as in Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004).
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Table 2.2: Largest banks in the sample as of 2003
Latin Americaa East Asia
Bank name TA in mil.$ Bank name TA in mil.$
BBVA Bancomer MX 43,244.45 Kookmin Bank KR 154,328.23
BANAMEX MX 41,706.95 Woori Bank KR 86,583.25
Banco Santander Serfin MX 27,764.04 Hana Bank KR 69,010.90
Nacional Financieras SNC MX 20,932.95 Industrial Bank of Korea KR 60,022.47
Banco Santander Chile CL 19,878.45 Shinhan Bank KR 58,752.14
HSBC Mexico MX 18,013.53 Korea Exchange Bank KR 52,447.68
Banco del Estado de Chile CL 14,977.85 Chohung Bank KR 49.615,63
BANORTE MX 14,953.08 Malayan Banking MY 37,776.61
Banco de Chile CL 17,744.21 Citibank Korea KR 36,056.18
BANOBRAS MX 13,205.06 Bangkok Bank TH 34,294.27
BCI CL 10,635.82 Islamic Bank of TH TH 29,381.16
Scotiabank Inverlat MX 9,297.63 Bank Mandiri ID 29,038.16
a Bold letters indicate that a bank is partly owned by a foreign parent company.
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Table 2.3: Estimation results for LA-6
Method: Panel least squares, Sample: 1992 2004
Cross-section fixed effects
Dependent Variable:a
Growth rate of real total loans
GDP growth 0.44∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.44∗∗
money market rate -0.54∗∗ -0.56∗∗ -0.56∗∗
GDP growth(-1) 0.24∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.23∗∗
money market rate(-1) -0.31∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗
US money market rate 5.44∗∗∗ 5.62∗∗∗ 5.62∗∗∗
depreciation – 0.01 0.01
size(-1) -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
capitalization(-1) 0.87∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
liquidity(-1) 0.64∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
foreign -0.24∗ -0.24∗ -0.24
size(-1)*SS 0.00 0.00 0.00
capitalization(-1)*SS 0.62∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
liquidity(-1)*SS -0.09 -0.11 -0.12
foreign*SS 0.12∗ 0.12∗ 0.09
high $ debt*SS – – 0.06
SS -0.08 -0.11∗ -0.11∗
R2 0.11 0.11 0.12
Cross-sections 348 348 348
Observations 2069 2069 2069
a SS indicates the sudden stop dummy variable, and (∗∗∗,∗∗,∗) indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level based on robust standard errors. The included countries are Argentina,
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia and Chile. Note that the coefficients associated with the
interaction terms between the macroeconomic control variables and the sudden stop dummy
are not reported.
44
Table 2.4: Estimation results for A-5
Method: Panel least squares, Sample: 1992 2004
Cross-section fixed effects
Dependent Variable:a
Growth rate of real total loans
GDP growth 1.85∗∗∗ 1.87∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗
money market rate 0.15 0.19 0.19
GDP growth(-1) 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
money market rate(-1) -2.13∗∗∗ -2.07∗∗∗ -2.07∗∗∗
US money market rate 2.53∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗
depreciation – -0.02 -0.02
size(-1) -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
capitalization(-1) 2.26∗∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗ 2.25∗∗∗
liquidity(-1) 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
foreign 0.08 0.09 0.09
size(-1)*SS 0.00 0.00 0.00
capitalization(-1)*SS -0.17 -0.22 -0.25
liquidity(-1)*SS -0.07 -0.02 -0.01
foreign*SS 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
high $ debt*SS – – 0.07
SS -0.38∗ -0.35∗ -0.31
R2 0.23 0.23 0.24
Cross-sections 384 384 384
Observations 2193 2193 2193
a SS indicates the sudden stop dummy variable, and (∗∗∗,∗∗,∗) indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level based on robust standard errors. The included countries are Thailand,
Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Korea. Note that the coefficients associated with the
interaction terms between the macroeconomic control variables and the sudden stop dummy
are not reported.
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Table 2.5: Estimation results for sudden stops coupled with major depreciations
Method: Panel least squares, Sample: 1992 2004
Cross-section fixed effects
Dependent Variable:a
Growth rate of real total loans
GDP growth 1.48∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗
money market rate 0.32 0.56∗ 0.56∗∗∗
GDP growth(-1) 0.13 0.15∗ -0.15∗∗
money market rate(-1) -0.37∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗ -0.27∗∗
US money market rate 1.64∗∗ 1.90∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗
depreciation – -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
size(-1) -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
capitalization(-1) 1.18∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗
liquidity(-1) 0.49∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
foreign 0.09 0.09 0.09
size(-1)*SS 0.00 0.00 0.00
capitalization(-1)*SS 0.85∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗ 0.87∗∗∗
liquidity(-1)*SS -0.17 -0.15 -0.12
foreign*SS 0.10∗ 0.10∗ 0.11
high $ debt*SS – – 0.05
SS -0.28∗∗ -0.34∗∗ -0.36∗∗
R2 0.14 0.15 0.15
Cross-sections 495 495 495
Observations 2752 2752 2752
a SS indicates the sudden stop dummy variable, and (∗∗∗,∗∗,∗) indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level based on robust standard errors. The included countries are Mexico,
Thailand, Indonesia, Uruguay, Philippines, Malaysia and Korea. Note that the coefficients
associated with the interaction terms between the macroeconomic control variables and the
sudden stop dummy are not reported.
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Table 2.6: Estimation results for sudden stops coupled with minor depreciations
Method: Panel least squares, Sample: 1992 2004
Cross-section fixed effects
Dependent Variable:a
Growth rate of real total loans
GDP growth 0.17 0.34 0.33
money market rate -1.02∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗ -1.20∗∗∗
GDP growth(-1) 0.20 0.16 0.16
money market rate(-1) -0.54∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗
US money market rate 5.80∗∗∗ 6.49∗∗∗ 6.46∗∗∗
depreciation – 0.05∗ 0.05
size(-1) -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
capitalization(-1) 0.80∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗
liquidity(-1) 0.62∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
foreign -0.24∗ -0.23∗ -0.23
size(-1)*SS 0.00 0.00 0.00
capitalization(-1)*SS 0.34∗ 0.35∗ 0.37∗
liquidity(-1)*SS -0.16 -0.16 -0.17
foreign*SS 0.17∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.18∗∗
high $ debt*SS – – 0.24
SS -0.10 -0.11∗ -0.13
R2 0.13 0.13 0.15
Cross-sections 237 237 237
Observations 1510 1510 1510
a SS indicates the sudden stop dummy variable, and (∗∗∗,∗∗,∗) indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level based on robust standard errors. The included countries are Argentina, Peru,
Bolivia and Chile. Note that the coefficients associated with the interaction terms between the
macroeconomic control variables and the sudden stop dummy are not reported.
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Table 2.7: Estimation results for deposits and equity
LA-6
Loans Deposits Equity
size(-1) -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
capitalization(-1) 0.88∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ -0.11
liquidity(-1) 0.64∗∗∗ 0.00 0.10
foreign -0.24∗ -0.19 -0.29∗∗
size(-1)*SS 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
capitalization(-1)*SS 0.58∗∗∗ -0.07 -0.12
liquidity(-1)*SS -0.11 -0.16 -0.13
foreign*SS 0.12∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.11∗∗
SS -0.11∗ -0.06 0.13∗∗
R2 0.11 0.07 0.06
Cross-sections 348 347 363
Observations 2069 2081 2156
A-5
Loans Deposits Equity
size(-1) -0.06∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗
capitalization(-1) 2.25∗∗∗ 3.66∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗
liquidity(-1) 0.41∗∗∗ -0.14∗ -0.13∗
foreign 0.09 0.06 0.13
size(-1)*SS 0.00 0.00 -0.00
capitalization(-1)*SS -0.22 1.27∗∗∗ -0.77∗
liquidity(-1)*SS -0.02 -0.82∗ -0.01
foreign*SS 0.18∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗ -0.07
SS -0.35∗ -0.04 -0.34∗
R2 0.23 0.11 0.11
Cross-sections 384 392 392
Observations 2193 2202 2202
a The results of specification (2) are reported. Note that only the coefficients associated with the
sudden stop dummy and the bank-specific variables are reported in this Table. As controls we
use as before real GDP growth, the real interest rate, and currency depreciation. SS indicates
the sudden stop dummy variable, and (∗∗∗,∗∗,∗) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level based on robust standard errors.
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Figure 2.1: Annual net capital inflows per GDP
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Figure 2.2: Bank loans over GDP
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Figure 2.3: Capital flows and the average banks’ lending and deposit volume
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Figure 2.4: Average bank size, liquidity, capitalization, and foreign bank participation
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Chapter 3
Currency Depreciations, Financial
Transfers, and Firm Heterogeneity
Michael Brei and Matthieu Charpe 1
In the present paper, we investigate the distributive aspects of currency collapses using
financial statements of Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican firms. We focus on two aspects,
namely, on income transfers from borrowing firms to lenders as well as on firms’ hetero-
geneity. These two aspects are addressed by decomposing firms’ income into its real and
financial components, and by making use of panel regressions to identify the determinants
of firms’ income during the currency collapses. We find evidence that income and wealth
transfers increase substantially with the currency depreciations. Moreover, most affected
are firms with foreign-currency debt and local-currency income. The distributive issues
of currency depreciations are further explored within a partial equilibrium model of firms
with varying income and debt structures.
Keywords: Currency crises, income distribution
JEL Classification: F34, E24
1Michael Brei, Bonn Graduate School of Economics, michael.brei@uni-bonn.de and Matthieu Charpe,
Paris School of Economics, charpe@pse.ens.fr. We would like to thank Herman Kamil for providing us
important data. Michel Juillard, Dominique Levy, and Carlos Winograd, we would like to thank for helpful
discussions, and the participants of the 8th RIEF conference in Barcelona (2008) and the 9th SALISES
conference in Kingston (2008) for their comments. The remaining errors are ours.
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3.1 Introduction
Despite the growing literature on currency crises, a central aspect has been understud-
ied, namely the distributive aspect of currency crises.2 Although theories that link the
income distribution and macroeconomic dynamics are longstanding, their application to
the case of currency crises has been largely unquestioned or left in the background. This
paper studies the distributive aspects of currency depreciations and their impact on macro
dynamics along two dimensions: (1) the effect of currency depreciations on the income
distribution between borrowers and lenders, and (2) the role of borrowers’ heterogeneity
in explaining the associated effects on the income distribution.
First, currency crises involve distributive issues between borrowers and lenders both
in terms of flows and stocks. Debt accumulation in foreign currency raises income trans-
fers from domestic borrowers to foreign lenders. Moreover, an exchange rate depreciation
raises the domestic-currency value of the stock of foreign-currency liabilities and trans-
lates into a transfer of wealth from domestic borrowers to foreign lenders. In addition,
interest payments in domestic currency increase both due to the stock effect and an asso-
ciated increase in the risk premium on external finance caused by the reduction in wealth
(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996)). In return, these transfers have macroeconomic
feedback effects as they affect firms’ investment decisions.3 Put differently, these trans-
fers are not neutral as they take place from agents with a large propensity to spend toward
agents with a large propensity to save. In this perspective, it shares similarities with Irving
Fisher’s and Hyman Minsky’s theories of financial crises.4 Second, another distributive
issue is related with firms’ heterogeneity. Heterogeneity implies that firms are not affected
evenly by currency crises and that there might be firms benefiting and firms losing from
an exchange rate depreciation. It is therefore crucial to identify along the dimensions in
which currency crises affect firm dynamics. In our work, two dimensions are stressed:
the degree to which firms are indebted in foreign currency, and the degree to which firms
have foreign-currency income.
The empirical part investigates and compares five episodes of large currency depre-
ciations from the perspective of non-financial firms operating in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico. We first decompose firms’ profit statements. Compared to investment, which
2Halac and Schmukler (2003) is an exception.
3It is reminiscent to Fisher (1933)’s ’debt-deflation’ argument that redistributions between creditors and
debtors arising from unanticipated price changes can have important real effects. Indeed, Fisher argued
that this kind of mechanism accounted for the depth of the Great Depression. To the extent that loans from
abroad are denominated in units of a foreign currency, an exchange rate collapse redistributes wealth from
domestic borrowers to foreign lenders.
4Minsky (1964) stresses the increasing income transfers linked with debt accumulation and interest
payments.
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is the usual variable considered, profitability has a distributive aspect as it measures the
surplus generated by firms, and its components give a clear picture of the income distri-
bution between the borrowing firms and their lenders. We find evidence that the currency
depreciations are preceded and associated with sharply rising financial payments (trans-
fers from firms to lenders), and that the firms’ debt and income structure is central in
explaining the asymmetric firm dynamics.
Second, we estimate panel regressions for each country to test whether the currency
composition of income and finance affects significantly firms’ income during large cur-
rency depreciations. In particular, we stress the impact of being indebted in foreign cur-
rency as well as being an exporter. This part shares some similarities with existing works
by Bleakley and Cowan (2002) as well as Aguiar (2005). Our value added is that we
make use of quarterly data for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, whereas the previous at-
tempts relied on annual data and focused on a single economy. Our study has therefore a
comparative dimension.
Third, we develop a partial equilibrium model of firms which links the firms’ cur-
rency composition of income and finance, their income distribution, and firm dynamics.
This part builds on general equilibrium models such as those of Aghion, Bacchetta, and
Banerjee (2004) and Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2000), which stress the importance
of microeconomic distortions, currency mismatches, and debt accumulation in explaining
contractionary currency depreciations. Our model shares features with the partial equi-
librium models developed in Cooper and Ejarque (2003) and Gilchrist and Sim (2007).
The model is calibrated to reproduce the dynamics of firms’ income in response to an
unexpected currency depreciation as a function of the degree to which firms are indebted
in foreign currency, and the degree to which firms have income in foreign currency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, average profit is de-
composed into its real and financial part and examined separately for the three economies
over time. The profit decomposition is done as well for the following groups of firms: high
versus low exporters, and firms with high versus low levels of foreign-currency debt. In
Section 3.3, we present the econometric results, and in Section 3.4 the theoretical model.
The final section concludes.
3.2 Income decompositions
In this section, firms’ net income is decomposed into its real and financial parts measured
by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and net financial payments, respectively.
This decomposition gives a clear picture of the income distribution between the borrow-
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ing firms and their lenders during periods of exchange rate depreciations. Thereafter,
firms’ heterogeneity is taken into account by reproducing the former income decomposi-
tion for two groups of firms: high vs. low export firms, and firms with high vs. low levels
of liability dollarization. This allows us to address the asymmetric effects of exchange
rate depreciations on firms’ income distribution. The investigation is conducted on five
episodes of exchange rate depreciation:5 Argentina’s crisis of 2001-02 with a deprecia-
tion of 200% with respect to the US$; Brazil’s currency crisis of 1998-99 and confidence
crisis of 2002 with depreciations of 70% and 50%, respectively; and Mexico’s Tequila
crisis of 1994-95 and its milder economic slowdown of 1998 with depreciations of 125%
and 20%.
The underlying firm-level data comes from Economatica which is a quarterly database
on firms’ profit and balance sheet statements for particular Latin American economies.6
The data was merged with data from Kamil (2004). Overall, we have information on more
than 10000 quarterly financial statements of about 230 Brazilian, 100 Mexican, and 80
Argentine publicly listed, non-financial firms over the period 1992-2004. 7
Figure 3.1 shows average net income, EBIT and net financial payments as a propor-
tion of total assets for each country.8 First, firms across the countries have in common
that net financial payments increase by more than the real part in the run up to the crises.
Net income decreases consequently before crises and firms are financially more fragile.
Second, financial payments reach high levels during the crises episodes. By increasing the
domestic value of foreign-currency debt and the external finance premium, the associated
depreciations increase the average burden of financial payments. The ratio of net financial
payments to total assets increases by much more during the Argentine crisis than that of
Brazilian and Mexican firms reaching 15% opposed to 4% in Brazil and 2% in Mexico.
From a distributive perspective this means that the rise in the financial burden increases the
income flows from the borrowing firms to their lenders. Third, the exchange rate depreci-
ations have contrasting effects on real profitability (EBIT over total assets) indicating that
the relative sizes of export sectors differ across the considered economies. In Argentina
5Box 1 in Appendix 3.6 describes the considered episodes from the macroeconomic perspective with a
focus on the key vulnerabilities of each economy.
6A more detailed description of the data can be found in Appendix 3.6.
7Although the number of firms is small, Economatica is to our knowledge the largest firm-specific data
set on Latin American firms that provides the required information for our analysis. For all countries, the
sum of the firms’ net operating revenues over GDP is about 30%. There is certainly a sample bias with
respect to large enterprises with foreign participation.
8The aggregation method is as follows: we sum the particular variable at each date over all firms and
divide it by the sum of total assets. Note that EBIT minus financial payments is not equal to net income as
taxes are omitted. The investigation was also done using fixed assets and equity as scaling variable instead
of total assets. The main conclusions hold. The Figures show weighted moving averages to remove seasonal
variations.
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the currency depreciation has a weak positive effect on EBIT, in contrast to Brazil and
Mexico where EBIT increases substantially. This evidence explains in part the shapes of
the economic rebound. In addition, Figure 3.1 shows aggregated firms’ net wealth over to-
tal assets for each country. The exchange rate depreciations have a strong negative impact
on net wealth in the presence of liability dollarization. The balance sheet effects involve
a transfer of wealth from the borrowing firms to their lenders. The effects are strongest
in Argentina and Mexico (in 1994-95) which are associated with drops in net wealth in
the order of 15% of total assets. In Brazil, the balance sheet effect is much weaker with
net wealth declining by 5% of total assets in 1999. The asysmmetric effect across coun-
tries can be explained by the fact that the currency mismatch is larger in Argentina and
Mexico where the average share of dollar-denominated liabilities in total assets reaches
75% in the event of crises opposed to the share of dollar-denominated assets and exports
which amount to about 20% of total assets. In contrary, Brazilian firms have on average
a relatively small currency mismatch where the share of dollar-denominated liabilities in
total assets amounts to 25% in 1999 and dollar-denominated assets and exports to 10%
of total assets. Finally, there is also evidence of an interest rate effect. Figure 3.1 shows
JP Morgan’s EMBI+ spread which is an aggregate measure of the country-specific risk
premium on dollar denominated bonds. It contributed as well to amplify income transfers
to lenders.
The previous graphs show that firms may face difficulties to meet financial commit-
ments due to the exchange rate depreciation. Low dollar debt firms and exporting firms,
however, may be relatively unaffected by the exchange rate depreciation. Consequently,
currency crises are likely to have asymmetric effects at the firm level. This is confirmed
by Figures 3.2 and 3.3, which compare the income decomposition between firms with
high and low levels of liability dollarization, and between high and low export firms.9
In all countries, high dollar debt firms are more affected by exchange rate depreciations
than low dollar debt firms. In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, financial payments of high
dollar debt firms are twice as high as those of low dollar debt firms during crises. More-
over, the currency mismatch between income and liabilities differs among the affected
economies. While the match between foreign debt and foreign income is absent in Ar-
gentina, it is strong in Mexico and in Brazil as EBIT of high dollar debt firms increases
strongly from 4 to 6% and from 5 to 8%, respectively. One may conclude that Brazilian
firms had some sort of natural hedge against exchange rate risk to the extent that firms
with foreign-currency debt are those firms with a large fraction of income in foreign-
currency. In all cases with the exception of Mexico in 1998 high export firms benefit from
the depreciations and recover quickly reaching higher profits than before. In Argentina,
9In Section 3.3, there is a detailed description of our measures for the firm categories.
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real profitability of high exporters increases from 6% in 2001 to 10% in 2002, in Brazil
it increases from 5% in 1999 to 10% in 2002, and in Mexico from 4% in 1994 to 6% in
1995. While net income drops in the early stage of the crises, it rebounds quickly and
goes beyond the pre-crisis level. If low export firms improve their real profitability, the
change is much more modest.
Overall, we find evidence that the interaction between currency depreciation and fi-
nance generate important income and wealth transfers from borrowers to lenders. In addi-
tion, firms’ trajectories become increasingly heterogeneous. In most cases, the sharp rise
in financial payments dominates the evolution of the firms’ profits, especially when low
levels of exports are coupled with high levels of foreign-currency denominated debt as
demonstrated in the case of Argentina. One might ask why did the firms take on foreign-
currency debt and did not hedge their currency exposure with currency swaps or futures.
First, fixed exchange rate systems increase the risk that borrowers underestimate currency
risk and rely too much on foreign-currency debt (as has been the case in Argentina before
2002, in Brazil before 1999, and in Mexico before 1994). Second, appropriate hedge in-
struments might not be available because domestic financial markets are underdeveloped,
or they might be too expensive in these countries. Moreover, if a crisis is systemic, firms
in distress might expect a bailout by the government and take on excessive financial risks.
3.3 Econometric results
This section provides statistical tests of the evidence from the descriptive statistics pre-
sented in the previous section using dynamic panel regression techniques. We test for two
distributive dimensions: firms-lenders income transfers and firms’ heterogeneity. With
respect to the first distributive dimension, we focus mainly on income transfers between
domestic firms and foreign lenders, rather than on wealth transfers. In the regressions,
the dependent variable is firms’ profitability. The firm-specific explanatory variables cap-
ture both the currency composition of income and finance. With respect to the second
distributive dimension, we test whether exporting firms and firms with low dollar debt
benefited from the currency depreciations. As a matter of fact, we test to what extent the
competitiveness and balance sheet effects explain the firms’ trajectories in response to the
currency collapses.
The following reduced form specification is estimated for each economy:
yi,t = α0 + αi + β1yi,t−1 + β2xt + β3zi,t + β4dt + β∗3zi,tdt + uit, (3.1)
where i refers to an individual firm and t to the time dimension. Moreover, yi,t denotes
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the annual change in the ratio of net income to total assets (profitability), xt a vector of
macroeconomic variables controlling for changes in economic and financial conditions,
zi,t a vector of firm-specific variables, and dt denotes a dummy variable that identifies
the periods of depreciation.10 The vector of firm-specific characteristics is interacted with
the crisis dummy, i.e. if there is significant asymmetry in the way firms’ profitability is
affected, β∗3 should be significantly different from zero. This specification allows us to
extract the direct impact of the firm-specific characteristics on profits during the depre-
ciations after controlling for aggregate macroeconomic conditions and other information
related to profits from the previous periods.
We distinguish between the following groups of firms: small vs. large firms, high vs.
low exporters, and high vs. low dollar debtors. As a measure for the firm size, we use the
ratio of a firm’s total assets to the country average of total assets in a given year. In the
case of Argentina and Brazil, a dummy variable that identifies firms with a high fraction
of dollar debt is constructed, because the information on the currency composition of
liabilities is annual in most cases. In particular, a firm is categorized as highly indebted
in foreign currency when its average ratio of dollar debt in domestic currency to total
liabilities lies in the upper 50% quantile of the distribution of the ratios of all firms in
the same country. In the case of Mexico, there is no lack of information and the ratio of
dollar debt to liabilities is used directly for estimation. Similarly, in many cases Argentine
and Brazilian firms do not report the quarterly amount of exports. Here, we follow the
same approach as before and construct a dummy variable that distinguishes high from low
exporters. In the case of Mexico, there is no lack of information and exports over sales is
used instead of a dummy variable.
Three specifications are estimated. In the baseline case, the only regressors are lagged
profits, the measures on dollar debtors and exporters, and their interactions with the de-
preciation dummy. Second, the domestic real interest rate enters the baseline case. The
interest rate is intended to control for aggregate domestic financial conditions and pos-
sible interest rate defenses of the exchange rate which cause higher aggregate financial
costs during crises. Third, real GDP growth enters the second specification to extract the
information related to the aggregate business cycle. And finally, the third specification is
augmented by the measure on firm size. The size of a firm is a variable commonly found
in the micro literature on firm performance. The results are nevertheless mitigated, i.e.
it is difficult to distinguish the advantages and disadvantages related to the size of firms.
Large firms may have stronger links with the banking sector what may be an advantage
in time of credit rationing. But small firms may be in a better position to react to large
10To identify the precise dates of large currency depreciations, we require that the period includes at least
one observation in which the depreciation lies one standard deviation above its sample mean. Except for
Mexico in 1998, the depreciation actually jumped beyond the two standard deviations band.
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shocks.
To estimate the dynamic panel regression, we use the panel variant of the General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). As
instruments for the lagged dependent variable, we use its 2nd to 4th lag, depending on
the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. The other variables serve as their own
instruments.11 In all specifications we use robust standard errors and examine the follow-
ing tests on misspecification: the Arellano-Bond test on autocorrelation and the Hansen
test on overidentifying restrictions. Moreover, we exclude outliers before estimation by
examining the distributions of the dependent variable. In all cases we exclude the 1% and
the 99% quantiles.
The final estimation results are summarized in Tables 3.1 to 3.3 in Appendix 3.6.
Concerning the results for Argentine firms presented in Table 3.1, the baseline estima-
tion shows that profitability is positively autocorrelated. An increase in profitability by
1% is followed, ceteris paribus, by an increase in profitability of about 0.8%. There are
five additional results. First, high exporters have a 1% lower profitability than low ex-
porters over the whole sample. This result is consistent with theories which point out
that capital account liberalization leads to exchange rate appreciation and a loss of com-
petitiveness for the external sector (Tornell and Westermann (2002)). In this perspective
some models interact Dutch disease models with models of currency crises (Kalantzis
(2007)). Second, the coefficient associated with high dollar debtors is positive but not
significant indicating that the currency composition of debt does not affect profitability
during normal times. This result may point to the fact that the choice between domestic
or dollar debt is not motivated by the level of interest rate paid, but rather by the inavail-
ability of peso denominated funds conform with the Original Sin theory (Eichengreen,
Hausmann, and Panizza (2002)). Third, the crisis of 2001-02 has a large negative impact
on firms’ average profitability, to be more precise, it entails a reduction in profitability of
6% for low exporters and low dollar debtors. Fourth, the balance sheet effect is measured
by the interaction of the high dollar debt and the depreciation dummy. Being indebted
in dollars has, as expected, a negative and significant effect on profitability, to be more
precise, high dollar debt firms have a 4% lower profitability during the depreciation than
low dollar debt firms. The share of income accruing to firms drops at the benefice of the
share of income accruing to their lenders. As mentioned before, this result stems from
the currency mismatch: stagnating or decreasing earnings are coupled with an increas-
ing stock of debt and, therewith, a rise in financial transfers to foreign lenders. Fifth,
the interaction term associated with the export dummy captures the competitiveness ef-
11We decided to use the lag of firm size due to a potential endogeneity problem. To be more precise,
there is a possible joint determination of a firm’s profitability and its size, since a firm is likely to expand
with high profits.
58
fect. The associated coefficient is positive and significant indicating that exporters have
benefited from the associated depreciation. Interestingly, while exporters were negatively
affected by the exchange rate overvaluation during the period of capital inflows, being
an exporter becomes an advantage during episodes of currency depreciation. On aver-
age, the profitability of high exporters is 10% higher during the depreciation than that of
low exporters. Profitability of high exporters that are low dollar debtors increases by 4%,
while profitability of low exporters that are high dollar debtors decreases by 10% during
the crisis. Introducing the real domestic interest rate as a control variable does not change
the main results.12 The coefficient on the interest rate is slightly insignificant. In the third
specification, the coefficient associated with real GDP growth is positive but insignificant.
The target coefficients on the export and debt variables are robust to the inclusion of the
macroeconomic control variables and remain largely unchanged. The fourth specification
introduces the firm size. The interaction term of size and the depreciation is negative
and significant indicating that larger firms are more adversely affected. The interaction
between the depreciation and dollar debt is no longer significant. This is due to the fact
that size is positively correlated with the dollar debt variable, i.e. large firms tend to have
more debt in dollars.13
The estimation results for Brazil are shown in Table 3.2. Again, profitability is signif-
icantly, positively autocorrelated in all specifications and the crisis dummies are negative
and significant. There is one main result that differs from the Argentinean case: There
is no evidence of a balance sheet effect as the coefficients associated with the interaction
of the depreciations and dollar debt are insignificant. The exchange rate depreciation did
not generate large income transfers from domestic firms to financial institutions. This
confirms our previous findings, i.e. Brazilian firms had a smaller currency mismatch be-
tween income and liabilities and some sort of natural hedge. As in Argentina, there is
evidence in favor of a competitiveness effect. High exporters have been less affected by
the depreciations, i.e. their profitability decreased only by 1% in 1999 and 2002. On the
contrary, profitability of low exporters decreases by 7% and 4%, respectively, with the
currency collapses. High and low dollar debtors are evenly affected and exports make the
difference. Given that the depreciations have been smaller than in Argentina and that the
financial crisis was rather limited, it is reasonable to find smaller balance sheet effects.
Introducing the macroeconomic control variables does not change the main results. In the
fourth specification, the size variable is negative and significant over the sample. Smaller
firms are on average more profitable than large firms during normal times. Contrary to
Argentina, the size of a firm has no influence on its profitability during the depreciations.
12Interest rate is calculated as money market rate minus WPI inflation.
13The correlation coefficient is 0.36 over the whole sample.
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The estimation results for Mexico are shown in Table 3.3.14 Profitability is signifi-
cantly autocorrelated across all specifications. As the macroeconomic control variables
are significant and showing the expected sign, we refer in the following to the third and
fourth specifications. There are two main results. First, similar to the Argentine and
Brazilian case, high exporters have a lower profitability during normal times, while dol-
lar debt has no significant impact on profitability. These results are well explained by
the appreciation of the exchange rate linked with capital account liberalization and by the
Original Sin theory. Second, as in the case of Argentina, dollar debtors are most adversely
affected during both currency depreciations. A competitiveness effect is only present dur-
ing the Tequila crisis. More specifically, profitability of firms that have no exports and
no dollar debt decreases by 1% during both episodes. Moreover, a 10% higher dollar
debt ratio implies a 0.12% and 0.7% lower profitability during the considered episodes.
Exporters benefited from the depreciation in 1994-95, i.e. a 10% higher exports to sales
ratio implies a 0.9% higher profitability.
To summarize, Argentina and Brazil constitute two opposite cases, while Mexico con-
stitutes an intermediate case. In Argentina, there was a massive transfer of income from
domestic firms to domestic and foreign banks, due to the fact, that firms were unable to
borrow in domestic currency. Within borrowers, firms most adversely affected have been
firms with high liability dollarization specialized in the production of domestic goods.
Conversely, in Brazil income transfers from domestic borrowers to lenders have been
more limited. Liability dollarization had no significant impact on firms. The Mexican
case shares similarities with the Argentine case, since adverse balance sheet effects were
present during both episodes of currency depreciations. The findings above also point to
the importance of the macroeconomic feedback effects of these distributive dimensions.
3.4 The theoretical model
The descriptive statistics in Section 3.2 highlight that the economic rebound following the
exchange rate depreciations was rather different in the three economies, and that the struc-
ture of firms’ income and debt shaped firms’ responses to the crises. In the following, we
develop a theoretical model to explore the financial mechanisms of unexpected currency
depreciations. In particular, we use a dynamic equilibrium model of a representative firm
which is characterized by different degrees of foreign-currency income and liabilities.
In our framework, unanticipated exchange rate depreciations might take place and affect
both the transfers of income and wealth between firms and their lenders as well as the
14As mentioned, we do not use dummies for the export and dollar debt groups since we have continuous
information on these variables.
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firm’s individual trajectory. In response, the firm adjusts production, investment, and em-
ployment decisions shaping the economic rebound. We use a partial equilibrium model
of a firm that maximizes the expected present value of dividends subject to constraints on
technology and finance. The firm produces domestically traded and exported goods using
capital, labor, and imports as production inputs. In line with the Original Sin theory, the
firm borrows external funds in foreign currency and domestic funds in local currency. The
model is based on Cooper and Ejarque (2003) and Gilchrist and Sim (2007). Our model
integrates elements that are missing in Cooper and Ejarque (2003), in particular, our pro-
duction function incorporates labor and imports, two goods are produced, and foreign
and domestic borrowing is allowed. With respect to the model developed by Gilchrist and
Sim (2007), our framework specifies dividend adjustment costs and a Taylor rule for the
domestic interest rate. We focus on the core mechanisms in a clear and stylized form and
calibrate the theoretical model to match a set of financial characteristics of the average
Argentine and Brazilian firm to compare the firms’ responses to an unexpected currency
depreciation.
3.4.1 Production and demand
The representative firm produces two goods that are sold in the domestic market YDt and
foreign market YFt, subject to a Cobb-Douglas technology using the same type of capital:
Yit = AtK
α
t−1(M
σi
it N
1−σi
it )
1−α, i = D,F. (3.2)
At denotes a stochastic productivity process and α the proportion of capital Kt−1 used in
the production of both types of goods. σi(1 − α) is the share of imported materials Mit
and (1− σi)(1− α) that of labor Nit in the production of Yit.
The firm sells the two differentiated goods in a monopolistic competition environment
facing the following isoelastic demand functions:
yit = Zip
−φi
it , i = D,F (3.3)
where φi ≥ 0 is the price elasticity of demand, Zi ≥ 0 is a demand scaling variable, and
pit the goods’ price in the local currency of the consumers.15 EBIT in period t can be
expressed as follows:
Πt = pDtYDt + etpFtYFt − wN(NDt +NFt)− etwM(MDt +MFt). (3.4)
15The demand function can be derived from a consumer’s perspective if its intertemporal utility function
is separable and isoelastic in the consumption good.
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The exchange rate et is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process in logs and is spec-
ified to match exchange rate dynamics during the crisis period:16
ln et = ρ ln et−1 + εet, εet ∼ N(0, σ2e), (3.5)
with ρ smaller than one in modulus. Wages and import prices wN and wM are assumed to
be constant and equal across the two sectors, although we could incorporate factor supply
functions similar to the demand functions for the to types of goods. Wages are denoted
in domestic currency and import prices in foreign currency. Note that under the pricing
assumptions, a currency depreciation translates one-to-one into domestic prices of exports
and imported materials, and the firm faces contrasting effects on operating profits. The
firm can invest It = Kt − (1 − δ)Kt−1 in the capital stock which depreciates at a rate
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. We assume that capital accumulation is subject to quadratic adjustment costs
(as in Cooper and Ejarque (2003)):
C(Kt, Kt−1) = (γ/2)(It/Kt−1)2Kt−1. (3.6)
where γ ≥ 0 denotes the adjustment cost parameter.
3.4.2 External finance
Our modeling of the firm’s external financial opportunities follows Gilchrist and Sim
(2007) with differences in the assumptions on domestic interest rates. In particular, we
assume that the domestic interest rate is determined by a Taylor rule, rather than by an
exogenous shock process as in Gilchrist and Sim (2007). We assume that the firm has
access to domestic and foreign credits of one-period maturity. Domestic loans LDt are
denominated in domestic currency and foreign loans LFt in foreign currency. Given the
firm borrows domestic and foreign loans in period t− 1, it has to repay RDt−1LDt−1 and
etRFt−1LFt−1 in period t. The domestic-currency value of total loans Lt is given by:
Lt = LDt + etLFt = νtLt + (1− νt)Lt, (3.7)
where νt = LDt/Lt is the fraction of domestic loans in total loans.
We assume that the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition holds:
RDt = Et(et+1/et)RFt, (3.8)
where RDt and RFt denote the domestic and foreign gross interest rates, respectively.
16In our notation a depreciation leads to an increase in et.
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Since the UIP condition implies that both interest rates are equal in the deterministic
steady state, it follows that the firm is initially indifferent between the currency compo-
sition of total credits. Therefore, in the deterministic steady state, we take the fraction of
domestic loans in total loans as a fixed parameter, i.e. ν = LD/L, following Gilchrist
and Sim (2007). Given the firm has outstanding foreign loans of LFt−1, it has to repay
etLFt−1 = (et/et−1)(1− ν)Lt−1 in period t.
Net new debt issuance in period t is given by:
etLFt −RFt−1etLFt−1 + LDt −RDt−1LDt−1
= Lt −RFt−1(et/et−1)(1− ν)Lt−1 −RDt−1νLt−1, (3.9)
which is a function of total loans.
In line with the Financial Accelerator theory, domestic and foreign interest rates are
inverse functions of the firm’s net wealthKt−Lt. In particular we assume that the interest
rates consists of a risk-free component and an external finance premium:
Rit = (1 + rit)(1 + µi(Lt, Kt)), i = D,F. (3.10)
The convex functions µi(.) measure the external finance premium of loans. The risk-free
foreign interest rate is assumed to be constant rFt = rF . while the domestic risk-free
interest rate follows a Taylor rule:
rDt = (1− ρr)(rF + ρpi(pit − p¯i) + ρY (YDt − Y¯D)) + ρrrDt−1 + rt, (3.11)
where rt is a domestic financial shock, 0 < ρr < 1 an autoregressive parameter, and
x¯ denotes variable x in the deterministic steady state. We assume that the central bank
sets the domestic interest rate conditional on deviations of domestic prices and produc-
tion from their long-run levels. The parameter ρr can be interpreted as the central bank’s
interest rate smoothing preference, ρpi its inflation aversion, and ρY measures its prefer-
ence to stabilize domestic production. Inflation is equal to pit = (pDt − pDt−1)/pDt−1.
In the absence of deviations from steady state, it is assumed that the central bank sets the
risk-free interest rate equal to the world’s interest rate. For simulation the external finance
premium is assumed to be common to domestic and foreign funds:
µ(Lt, Kt) = κ exp[Et(et+1/et)(1−ν)Lt+νLt−θ(1−δ)Kt−(L¯−θ(1−δ)K¯)], (3.12)
where κ > 0 is a parameter which measures responsiveness of the external finance pre-
mium to expected changes in net wealth. The parameter 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 measures the extent
to which lenders are willing to accept the undepreciated capital stock as a collateral. In
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steady state, the domestic and foreign interest rates are equal to (1 + rF )(1 + κ). The
exchange rate depreciation could be endogenized with the collateral parameter θ. To be
more precise, a shock that leads to a decrease in the willingness of foreign lenders to ac-
cept capital as a collateral, i.e. a decrease in θ, leads ceteris paribus to an increase in the
foreign interest rate over the domestic interest rate and therewith to an exchange rate de-
preciation. In the presence of foreign credits, the depreciation would have an amplifying
effect on the interest rates by reducing net wealth.
3.4.3 Equilibrium conditions
The firm chooses the amount of total loans Lt, capital Kt, and factor inputs
NDt, NFt,MDt,MFt to maximize the present value of future dividends Ft:
max
Lt,Kt,NDt,NFt,MDt,MFt
Et−1
∞∑
t=0
βtFt (3.13)
Ft = Πt − It − C(Kt, Kt−1) + Lt −RPt −Ψ(Ft)
subject to the constraints (3.2-3.6, 3.10-3.12) and the market clearing conditions for both
types of goods. The dividends Ft are expressed relative to the price of investment (nor-
malized to one) consisting of earnings Π (eq. 3.4), the costs associated with investments,
net new debt issuance Lt−RPt, and costs associated with changes in dividend payments.
RPt denotes repayment value of outstanding debt and given by:
RPt = RFt−1(et/et−1)(1− ν)Lt−1 +RDt−1νLt−1. (3.14)
The function Ψ(Ft) = (ψ/2)(Ft − F¯ )2 captures frictions in equity financing (Lintner
(1956), Miller and Rock (1985), and Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000)) and reduces the
substitution between debt and equity finance.
The optimality condition with respect to imported materials and labor in the produc-
tion of the two types of goods requires that marginal costs are equal to marginal benefits:
etwM = (1− α)σiZ
1
φi
it [(φi − 1)/φi]Y
φi−1
φi
it (1/Mit), i = D,F, (3.15)
wN = (1− α)(1− σi)Z
1
φi
it [(φi − 1)/φi]Y
φi−1
φi
it (1/Nit), i = D,F. (3.16)
Due to the assumption of monopolistic competition the firm internalizes the demand func-
tion. The intertemporal optimality condition with respect to capital equates costs and
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benefits of an additional unit of capital:17
[1 + ∂C(Kt, Kt−1)/∂Kt][1/(1− ψ(Ft − F¯ ))] (3.17)
= Etβ{[∂pDt+1YDt+1/∂Kt + et+1∂pFt+1YFt+1/∂Kt
+ (1− δ)− ∂C(Kt+1, Kt)/∂Kt
− (et+1/et)(1− ν)(∂RFt/∂Kt)Lt − ν(∂RDt/∂Kt)Lt]
· [1/(1− ψ(Ft+1 − F¯ ))]}.
On the right hand side, the expected benefits are composed of the marginal product of an
additional unit of capital, its resale value after capital depreciation, its impact on capital
adjustment costs, and its effect on the interest rate on loans. In particular, a higher capital
stock in period t reduces both capital adjustment costs and interest payments in t+ 1.
The intertemporal optimality condition with respect to loans implies that benefits are
equal to the expected costs of an additional unit of loans:
1/(1− ψ(Ft − F¯ )) = Etβ{[(et+1/et)(1− ν)((∂RFt/∂Lt)Lt +RFt)
+ ν((∂RDt/∂Lt)Lt +RDt)]
· [1/(1− ψ(Ft+1 − F¯ ))]}. (3.18)
The expected costs of an additional unit of external funds are equal to the sum of the
repayment including interests and its effect on the interest rate on loans.
3.4.4 Calibration and simulation
In the following, the calibration and simulation results are summarized. In particular, we
focus on steady state deviations of net income NIt = Πt − FPt, and its real, Πt, and
financial components, FPt = (RFt−1− 1)(et/et−1)(1− ν)Lt−1 + (RDt−1− 1)νLt−1, net
wealth Kt − Lt, and net new debt issuance NDt = Lt −RPt.
The model is calibrated as follows. In the first step, we fix the structural parameters
to be conform with the existing literature on small open economies (Gilchrist and Sim
(2007) and Mendoza (2006a)). The parameters β, rF , and κ are restricted such that the
firm is a net debtor in the deterministic steady state (see Appendix 3.6, eq. 3.22). The
particular parameter values are summarized in Table 3.4. In the second step, the parame-
ters ξ = (ZF , ZD, φD = φF , σF = σD, wN , wM , θ) are allowed to vary in a fixed interval
such that the firm matches three long-run ratios in the steady state: a debt-to-capital ratio
17The partial derivatives can be found in the Appendix 3.6.
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X¯1 = L¯/K¯, a ratio of financial payments to capital X¯2 = F¯P/K¯, and an exports-to-sales
ratio X¯3 = e¯p¯F Y¯F/(e¯p¯F Y¯F + p¯DY¯D). The target ratios are determined with our data on
firms prior to crisis. We do this exercise for Argentine and Brazilian firms separately and
compare the resulting responses to an unexpected depreciation. These two countries are
interesting cases, because the firms have polar income and liability structures. The pa-
rameters (ZF , ZD, φD = φF ) determine the relative demand for the foreign and domestic
good, while (σF = σD) and (wN , wM) determine the import share in production and rel-
ative costs of labor and imports, respectively. Finally, the collateral parameter θ controls
for the responsiveness of the risk premium to changes in the capital stock. The matching
is done numerically, to be more precise, first the steady state of the model is written in
terms of structural parameters, and then the following objective function is minimized:18
min
ξ
a1(X¯1 − b1)2 + a2(X¯2 − b2)2 + a3(X¯3 − b3)2, (3.19)
where ai denote weights that are inverse functions of the variance of ratio bi.
The target steady state debt-to-capital ratios are b1 = (0.5, 0.6) for Argentina and
Brazil, respectively.19 Moreover, the targets of the financial payments to capital ratio
are equal, i.e. b2 = (0.02, 0.02). The main difference between Argentina and Brazil is
captured by the fraction of dollar debt in total debt, 1 − ν, which is equal to 0.6 and 0.2,
respectively, as well as by the fraction of exports in sales, b3, which is equal to 0.05 and
0.14. The resulting parameter estimates and steady state ratios are shown in Table 3.4.
Based on the parameter estimates, we simulate the model numerically using a second-
order Taylor approximation around the deterministic steady state. We abstract from tech-
nology shocks focusing on the effect of a shock to the exchange rate. In both cases, we set
the persistence parameter of the exchange rate process to ρ = 0.9. As we are interested in
reproducing quantitatively the firms dynamics during the actual currency depreciations,
we consider an unexpected depreciation of 200% in the Argentine case, and of 50% in the
Brazilian case.
The resulting impulse responses are shown in Figure 3.4. The distributive aspects
highlighted in the previous sections appear clearly in the simulations. In Argentina, the
devaluation increases interest payments by much more than in Brazil, i.e. by 7% over
capital in Argentina opposed to 1% in Brazil. Moreover, the increase in financial pay-
ments is more pronounced in Argentina reaching its steady state level after 30 quarters.
18The steady state for φi = φ and σi = σ is derived in Appendix 3.6. As starting values, we take the
parameters from Table 3.4. A constrained nonlinear minimization is performed, i.e. the parameters are
required to be in a fixed interval around the starting value.
19The target ratios are calculated as the average ratio of all firms in our sample before the currency
depreciation.
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This constitutes a higher transfer of income from the firm to its lenders. Interest payments
increase both as a result of the higher domestic value of the debt stock and the higher risk
premium. Given the relatively small export sector in Argentina, the firm’s earnings do
not increase as much as financial payments, and net income drops to -10% of capital af-
ter one quarter. Contrastingly, export income improves over time by more than financial
payments in Brazil resulting in an increase of net income above steady state. The de-
preciations also have balance sheet effects. Net wealth decreases with the depreciations,
and the resulting wealth transfer depends on the fraction of foreign debt in total debt. In
Argentina, net wealth drops by 120% while in Brazil the decrease is much more modest.
The drop below 100% in Argentina can be explained by an important reduction in external
borrowing combined with a contraction in the capital stock.
Overall, income and wealth transfers increase by more in the case of the Argentine
firm. For a given level of exchange rate depreciation, the result is explained by two finan-
cial mechanisms: (1) the higher fraction of dollar debt in Argentina has a higher, adverse
impact on the firm’s balance sheet and risk premium, and (2) the higher export share in
Brazil increases earnings counteracting the adverse financial impact of the depreciation.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated some of the distributive aspects associated with currency
depreciations from an empirical and theoretical point of view. We mainly focused on two
aspects that seemed the most important according to us: borrower and lender transfers as
well as firm heterogeneity.
These two aspects are addressed by decomposing firm profitability into its real and
financial components and by making use of panel regressions to identify the real and
financial variables that explain firms’ profitability. Lastly, these two distributive issues
are analyzed within a partial equilibrium model. There are three main results.
First, we identified three channels through which currency depreciations increase
transfers from borrowers to lenders. There is a balance sheet channel as the currency
depreciation reduces borrowers’ net wealth. The net wealth to asset ratio decreases be-
tween 5 to 15 percentage points, depending on the country taken into account. There is
as well a flow channel as higher liabilities raise financial payments to lenders. Financial
payments peaked to 15% of total assets in Argentina. In addition, high dollar debt firms
experienced a 3% to 12% drop in profitability in the three affected economies. Eventually,
there is an interest rate effect as the country risk premium reached 20% to 80%.
Second, we identified two levels of heterogeneity. At the firm level, those firms that
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benefited from the devaluation have been specialized in the export sector, while having
a rather low levels of foreign-currency debt. On the other hand, firms losing from the
devaluation were specialized in the domestic sector, while having a high level of foreign
liabilities. In Argentina, winning firms experienced a 4% increase in profitability, while
losing firms experienced a 10% decrease in profitability. At the country level, Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico display three contrasting examples. Argentina is an economy with
a large currency mismatch, Brazil has some sort of natural hedge, and Mexico occupies
an intermediate position. Consequently, the wealth and income transfers have been three
time higher in Argentina than in Brazil.
Third, the theoretical model enables us to reproduce the empirical evidence concern-
ing these distributive issues. As a result of the currency depreciation, firms indebted in
foreign currency experience a drop in net wealth, and an increase in interest payments as
a result of both, a higher debt burden and increased interest rate payments.
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3.6 Appendix
Data
Firm-level data: Source – Economatica, Version 2003Mar07. Economatica tracks
information on the financial reports of publicly listed firms from US, Mexico, Venezuela,
Columbia, Peru, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. For our sample of countries, Economatica
provides information on about 300 Brazilian, 80 Argentine and 150 Mexican firms. We
exclude financial companies from the sample.
Herman Kamil provided us additional data from Kamil (2004) which we merged with
the information from Economatica. The database consists of firm-level data for public and
non-publicly traded companies in Latin America and presents detailed and comparable
information on the currency composition of assets and liabilities.
Macroeconomic data: Source – International Financial Statistics, 2006. Included
variables: GDP (series 99B), GDP deflator (series 99BIP), money market rate (series
60B), consumer price index (series 64ZF), wholesale price index (series 63ZF), market
exchange rate (series ZF)
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Boxes
Box 1: The crises from a macroeconomic perspectivea
Mexico:
The vulnerability in 1994 stemmed from the following factors: (1) the fixed ex-
change rate and capital inflows resulted in a real appreciation of the peso and a
large and growing current account deficit; and (2) the private and public sector
had important currency mismatches on their balance sheets (Roubini and Setser
(2004)). Fiscal deficits were moderate. Several political shocks hit the country:
the Chiapas revolt; the assassination of the appointed presidential candidate; and
the electoral uncertainty. External shocks, notably, the increase in US interest
rates reduced investors’ willingness to finance the current account deficit. The
government replaced domestic peso-denominated debts (cetes) with domestic
dollar-linked bonds (tesobonos), because it was difficult to sell peso debt in the
face of concerns about the exchange rate. The overvalued currency and the need
to balance the current account made the devaluation unavoidable. During the cri-
sis, households with foreign-currency denominated mortgages, as well as firms
that had dollar liabilities but lacked export revenues, were not able to service
their foreign-currency debts and the government implemented a bailout program
(Fobaproa) costing around 20% of GDP (Roubini and Setser (2004)). The finan-
cial distress of many private borrowers was one reason why Mexico’s banking
system had a severe crisis. The Mexican government went into the crisis with a
relatively low level of debt and beared the costs of the firm and bank bailout and
the higher real burden of its own foreign-currency debt. After a strong recov-
ery, Mexico was hit again by external shocks in 1998 that pushed the economy
into lower-than-expected growth and higher-than-expected inflation. First, the
Asian financial crises and Russia’s debt default resulted in a significant decrease
in capital inflows across emerging market economies on the whole, including
Mexico. And second, the drop in oil prices affected adversely the goverment’s
income as oil revenues represented about a third of its revenues (Roubini and
Setser (2004)).
Brazil:
Brazil experienced two crises: one in 1998-99 and a second in 2001-02. As
Roubini and Setser (2004) argue, the governments’ choices in its first crisis
created the vulnerabilities that led to the second crisis. The vulnerability in
1998 stemmed from two factors: (1) the overvalued currency, resulting from the
pegged exchange rate and the inflation inertia, generated an increasing current
account deficit which was increasingly financed by cross-border bank borrow-
ing; and (2) the large fiscal deficit.
aThe survey is largely based on Roubini and Setser (2004).
70
Box 1 (continued)
These factors contributed to the current account imbalance and led to the ac-
cumulation of domestic and external debt. At the beginning of 1998, Brazilian
banks and firms were subject to important maturity and currency mismatches on
their balance sheets (Roubini and Setser (2004)). A currency devaluation would
have had a severe impact on the private sector’s balance sheets. The central bank,
however, sold more than 40 billion dollars of reserves to defend the peg. This
allowed many private financial and corporate firms to hedge their currency expo-
sure - either by increasing their holdings of foreign assets or by paying down their
external debt (Roubini and Setser (2004)). The government also increased its is-
suance of domestic dollar-linked debt helping banks and firms to hedge against
the risk of a devaluation. The currency collapse, consequently, resulted in a large
increase in public debt. But the economy retained significant vulnerabilities. The
stock of public debt to GDP rose from 40% in 1997 to over 72% in 2002, despite
a significant fiscal adjustment (Roubini and Setser (2004)). As Argentina’s cri-
sis deepened, the government renewed the issuance of foreign-currency linked
debt to meet the demand for hedging products and to intervene in the foreign ex-
change market. The combination of investors’ increased risk aversion following
Argentina’s crisis and concerns about the upcoming election and future policy
resulted in a significant fall in foreign financing and an important depreciation of
the real.
Argentina:
Argentina’s crisis stemmed from four main vulnerabilities: (1) the currency
board resulted in an increasingly overvalued currency as the dollar appreciated
and, particularly, after the Brazilian currency depreciation of 1999; (2) the ex-
ternal imbalances created by the overvalued currency were increasingly difficult
to finance, especially since 1998; (3) persistent fiscal deficits led to the accumu-
lation of a large stock of public debt; and (4) the corporate sector was subject
to an important liability dollarization. More than 70% of domestic and exter-
nal government debt was denominated in dollars. Moreover, domestic Argentine
bank deposits were denominated in dollars, similarly most of the loans granted to
domestic firms and households. The banking system’s currency mismatch was
moderate, but not its currency risk since it transfered the currency risk to the
borrowing firms. The crisis resulted from these strutural vulnerabilities and a
series of external shocks: (1) Russia’s debt default in 1998 caused a significant
increase in the costs of external bonds; (2) the fall in global commodity prices
worsened the country’s terms of trade; (3) Brazil’s devaluation in 1999 made
Argentina’s exports less competitive; and (4) the appreciation of the dollar from
1998 to 2001 resulted in a nominal and real appreciation of the peso relative to
Argentina’s other trading partners (Roubini and Setser (2004)). After the run on
domestic securities and the domestic banking system, the government decided to
devalue and to impose capital controls (corralito).
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Estimation results for Argentine non-financial firms
Method: One-step system GMM
Dependent variable:a
Annual difference of net income over total assets
y(-1) 0.83∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗
export -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗
$ debt 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
mm rate – -0.02 -0.01∗ -0.01
gdp – – 0.04 0.05
size(-1) – – – 0.002
depreciation -0.06∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.05∗ -0.06∗∗
depreciation*export 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
depreciation*$ debt -0.04∗ -0.05∗ -0.05∗ -0.01
depreciation*size(-1) – – – -0.03∗∗∗
observations 2232 2232 2232 2232
cross-sections 84 84 84 84
AR(2) 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.70
Hansen 0.16 0.23 0.24 0.25
a The dummy variable depreciation equals to 1 during the period Q1/02-Q4/02. In all
specifications, the included explanatory variables and the 2nd to the 4th lag of the dependent
variable were used as instruments. The significance tests are based on autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. (∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level. ’AR(2)’ shows the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test on second-order
autocorrelation, and ’Hansen’ the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.
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Table 3.2: Estimation results for Brazilian non-financial firms
Method: One-step system GMM
Dependent variable:
Annual difference of net income over total assets
y(-1) 0.70∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
export -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗
$ debt -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003
mm rate – -0.08∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
gdp – – -0.02 -0.02
size(-1) – – – -0.002∗
depreciation1 -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
depreciation1*export 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
depreciation1*$ debt 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05
depreciation1*size(-1) – – – -0.01
depreciation2 -0.04∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.04∗∗
depreciation2*export 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.03∗∗
depreciation2*$ debt 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.001
depreciation2*size(-1) – – – 0.04
observations 3701 3701 3701 3701
cross-sections 192 192 192 192
AR(2) 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37
Hansen 0.34 0.33 0.54 0.61
a The dummy variable depreciation1 equals to 1 during the period Q1/99-Q4/99 and
depreciation2 during Q1/02-Q4/01. In all specifications, the included explanatory variables
and the 2nd and 3th lag of the dependent variable were used as instruments. The significance
tests are based on autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. (∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗)
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.’AR(2)’ shows the p-value of the
Arellano-Bond test on second-order autocorrelation, and ’Hansen’ the p-value of the Hansen
test of overidentifying restrictions.
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Table 3.3: Estimation results for Mexican non-financial firms
Method: One-step system GMM
Dependent variable:
Annual difference of net income over total assets
y(-1) 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
export -0.01∗ -0.01 -0.01 -0.01∗
$ debt 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005
mm rate – -0.09∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
gdp – – 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
size(-1) – – – -0.001
depreciation1 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.02∗∗ -0.01∗∗
depreciation1*export 0.06 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
depreciation1*$ debt -0.02 -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
depreciation1*size(-1) – – – 0.01∗∗∗
depreciation2 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01∗ -0.01∗
depreciation2*export 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
depreciation2*$ debt -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
depreciation2*size(-1) – – – -0.01
observations 3709 3709 3709 3709
cross-sections 100 100 100 100
AR(2) 0.38 0.09 0.12 0.26
Hansen 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26
a The dummy variable depreciation1 equals to 1 during the period 94/Q4-95/Q4 and
depreciation2 during Q4/97-Q3/98. In all specifications, the included explanatory variables
and the 2nd lag of the dependent variable were used as instruments. The significance tests are
based on autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. (∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗) indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. ’AR(2)’ shows the p-value of the Arellano-Bond
test on second-order autocorrelation, and ’Hansen’ the p-value of the Hansen test of
overidentifying restrictions.
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Table 3.4: Structural parameters and the steady state
Parameters Value Interval Results Description
Arg. Bra.
Production
β 0.96 time preference
α 0.4 capital share in production
δ 0.012 capital depreciation
γ 0.5 capital adjustment cost
wN 0.5 [0.4,0.6] 0.47 0.50 cost of labor
wM 0.5 [0.4,0.6] 0.49 0.50 cost of imports
σF , σD 0.2 [0.15,0.25] 0.20 0.21 import share in F-production
Finance
ν 0.4 0.8 fraction of domestic in total debt
κ 0.02 financial friction parameter
rF 0.01 risk free interest rate
ψ 0.5 dividend adjustment cost
θ 0.1 [0.05, 0.15] 0.09 0.1 collateral parameter
Demand
ZF 0.1 [0.01,0.15] 0.01 0.03 scale parameter foreign demand
ZD 0.4 [0.3,0.5] 0.5 0.46 scale parameter domestic demand
φD, φF 1.5 [1.1,1.9] 1.58 1.49 price elasticity of demand
Monetary policy
ρr 0.5 AR(1) coefficient Taylor rule
ρpi 1 inflation coeff. in Taylor rule
ρY 0.05 output coeff. in Taylor rule
Shock process
ρ 0.9 AR(1) coefficient exchange rate
σe 2 0.5 size of the depreciation
Steady states Target Results
Arg. Bra. Arg. Bra.
L¯/K¯ 0.5 0.60 0.51 0.61 debt over assets
F¯P/K¯ 0.02 0.02 0.015 0.018 financial payments over assets
e¯p¯F Y¯F
e¯p¯F Y¯F+p¯DY¯D
0.05 0.14 0.07 0.14 exports over sales
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Figure 3.1: Flow, stock, and price effects of the currency collapses
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(a) Argentina income decomposition
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(b) Brazil income decomposition
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(c) Mexico income decomposition
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Figure 3.2: Income decomposition for high and low dollar debt firms
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(a) Argentina high $ debt
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(b) Argentina low $ debt
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(c) Brazil high $ debt
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Figure 3.3: Income decomposition for high and low export firms
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Figure 3.4: Simulations for Argentina and Brazil
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(a) Profit decomposition, Argentina
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(b) Profit decomposition, Brazil
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(c) Wealth and debt issuance, Argentina
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(d) Wealth and debt issuance, Brazil
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(e) Exchange rate and finance, Argentina
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(f) Exchange rate and finance, Brazil
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Theoretical Appendix
Derivatives
The partial derivatives in the intertemporal optimality condition for capital (eq. 3.17) are
the following:
∂pit+1Yit+1
∂Kt
= α
φi − 1
φi
Z
1
φi
i
Y
φi−1
φi
it+1
Kit
, i = D,F
∂RFt
∂Lt
= (1 + rF )κ exp[
et+1
et
(1− ν)Lt + νLt − θ(1− δ)Kt
−(Lss − θ(1− δ)Kss)](et+1
et
(1− ν) + ν)
∂RFt
∂Kt
= −(1 + rF )κ exp[et+1
et
(1− ν)Lt + νLt − θ(1− δ)Kt
−(Lss − θ(1− δ)Kss)]θ(1− δ)
∂RDt
∂Lt
= (1 + rDt)κ exp[
et+1
et
(1− ν)Lt + νLt − θ(1− δ)Kt
−(Lss − θ(1− δ)Kss)](et+1
et
(1− ν) + ν)
∂RDt
∂Kt
= −(1 + rDt)κ exp[et+1
et
(1− ν)Lt + νLt − θ(1− δ)Kt
−(Lss − θ(1− δ)Kss)]θ(1− δ)
∂C(Kt, Kt−1)
∂Kt
= γ
It
Kt−1
∂C(Kt+1, Kt)
∂Kt
= γ
It+1
Kt
(
1
2
It+1
Kt
− Kt+1
Kt
)
Steady state
In this section, we derive the steady state for the symmetric case, i.e. φF = φD = φ
and σF = σD = σ. Note that the time subscripts are omitted. From the UIP condition it
follows:
RF = RD. (3.20)
The foreign gross interest rate is given by:
RF = (1 + rF )(1 + κ). (3.21)
Using this and the optimality condition for external funds (eq. 3.18) it follows:
L =
1
(1 + rF )κ
(
1
β
− (1 + rF )(1 + κ)). (3.22)
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This implies that the firm borrows external funds, when it is more impatient than the credit
market, i.e. 1/β > (1 + rF )(1 + κ). This gives rise to parameter restrictions on κ, rF and
β since a firm that is a net borrower is analyzed.
From the optimality condition for capital (eq. 3.17) it follows:
1 + γδ = β[−(1 + r)κθL (3.23)
+eα
φ− 1
φ
Z
1
φ
F Y
φ−1
φ
F
1
K
+ α
φ− 1
φ
Z
1
φ
DY
φ−1
φ
D
1
K
+(1− δ)− γδ(1
2
δ − 1)].
In the following, we derive an expression for Yi as a function of K only. From the opti-
mality conditions for imports (eq. 3.15) it follows:
Mi = aMiY
φ−1
φ
i , i = D,F (3.24)
aMi =
1
ewM
(1− α)σZ
1
φ
i
φ− 1
φ
.
For labor (eq. 3.16) it holds:
Ni = aNiY
φ−1
φ
i , i = D,F (3.25)
aNi =
1
wN
(1− α)(1− σ)Z
1
φ
i
φ− 1
φ
.
Using Yi = AKα(Mσi N
1−σ
i )
1−α, it follows that output can be written as a function of K:
Yi = (AK
α(aσMia
1−σ
Ni )
1−α)
1
1−(1−α)φ−1
φ (3.26)
= (AKαX1−αi )
z, where
Xi = a
σ
Mia
1−σ
Ni and z =
1
1− (1− α)φ−1
φ
.
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Using the optimality condition for capital from above eq. 3.23 it follows:
1 + γδ = β[−(1 + r)κθL
+eα
φ− 1
φ
Z
1
φ
F ((AK
αX1−αF )
z)
φ−1
φ
1
K
+α
φ− 1
φ
Z
1
φ
D((AK
αX1−αD )
z)
φ−1
φ
1
K
+(1− δ)− γδ(1
2
δ − 1)]
= β[n+m((AKαX1−αF )
z)
φ−1
φ
1
K
+o((AKαX1−αD )
z)
φ−1
φ
1
K
+ u],
where
n = −(1 + r)κθL
m = eα
φ− 1
φ
Z
1
φ
F
o = α
φ− 1
φ
Z
1
φ
D
u = (1− δ)− γδ(1
2
δ − 1).
Let q = z φ−1
φ
, then the steady state capital stock can be expressed as a function of the
parameters:
K = (
1
mAqX
(1−α)q
F + oA
qX
(1−α)q
D
(
1 + γδ
β
− n− u)) 1αq−1 . (3.27)
This determines the firm’s steady state. Prices are equal to:
pF = Z
1
φ
F YF
− 1
φ , (3.28)
pD = Z
1
φ
DYD
− 1
φ . (3.29)
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Chapter 4
International Financial Shocks in
Emerging Market Economies
Michael Brei and Almira Buzaushina 1
In the present paper, we develop a two-sector general equilibrium model of a small
open economy to explore the transmission mechanisms of external financial shocks. In
particular, we use a cash-in-advance model with limited participation augmented with
a financial friction in the form of a ’fundamentals-related’ risk premium on external
funds. The friction amplifies the economic effects of external financial shocks, especially,
when the economy is highly indebted in foreign currency. For a set of Latin American
economies, the theoretical model is calibrated to match the empirical impulse responses
of output, investment, trade balance, and domestic credits in response to a shock in the
country risk premium.
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4.1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, a number of major emerging market (EM) economies have
experienced serious financial crises. Many of these crises appear to have been triggered
by systemic sudden stops in which massive capital outflows and skyrocketing EM bond
spreads affected a wide range of EM economies at approximately the same time. Many of
these crises have been associated with large and persistent drops in investment and growth.
These observations are illustrated in Figure 4.1 which plots country spreads and invest-
ment of five Latin American economies (LA-5).2 Remarkably, the countries’ external
spreads (EMBI+ spreads) are highly correlated across countries and increase sharply dur-
ing the major crisis periods of 1994-95, 1998, and 2001-02. The exception is Ecuador’s
currency crisis in 2000 which had no major impact on the other countries. Moreover,
domestic investment drops in most cases with the onset of the financial shocks. Calvo,
Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006) emphasize that such external shocks can be followed by a
painful adjustment and sharp reduction in economic growth, or, become a minor reces-
sion. The particular outcome depends ultimately on the structure of a country’s balance
sheet and income sources, and the credibility of fiscal and monetary policy.
In the present paper, we explore the associated adjustment mechanisms in response
to an unexpected, adverse shock to the costs of foreign funding in a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model (DSGE) of a small open economy that faces financial market
frictions. The initial shock is incorporated exogenously in the risk premium on foreign-
currency denominated funds of the corporate sector and is amplified as the associated cur-
rency depreciation increases both the domestic value of outstanding debt (adverse balance
sheet effect) and the ’fundamentals-related’ part of the risk premium (adverse interest rate
effect). We simulate the model and match the theoretical impulse responses to the risk pre-
mium shock with the corresponding empirical impulse responses of output, investment,
trade balance, and domestic credits resulting from a structural panel vector-autoregressive
(VAR) model for the LA-5 countries.
The theoretical model can be applied to study the effects of systemic financial shocks
originating in international capital markets on EM economies. Such systemic external
shocks seem to have been at play during the Tequila crisis in 1994-95, the East Asian crisis
of 1997, the Russian crisis of 1998, and the Argentine crisis of 2001-02 (Calvo (1998a),
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006), and Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh (2003)). In all
cases, a worse-than-expected crisis in one country spread out to a variety of economies
in terms of exchange rate systems, capital controls, fiscal stance, growth performance,
and balance sheet mismatches. The international contagion had different origins. Com-
2The countries include Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru.
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mon creditor linkages seem to have been in the foreground during the Tequila and Rus-
sian crises, while pressures for competitive devaluations were present in Asia and Ar-
gentina after Thailand’s devaluation of 1997 and Brazil’s devaluation of 1999, respec-
tively (Roubini and Setser (2004)). However, many EM economies are not innocent
victims in this process. In many instances, domestic weaknesses such as currency mis-
matches on the economies’ balance sheets and high levels of external short-term debt
were the source of the underlying financial fragility and vulnerability to a financial crisis.
The theoretical literature on financial crises from the perspective of EM economies,
typically, incorporates financial markets that are subject to frictions. There are two main
approaches: models that include either a credit constraint (Arellano and Mendoza (2003),
Mendoza (2006b), and Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2004)), or an external finance pre-
mium (Cook and Devereux (2005) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005)). Except for Cook and
Devereux (2005), who study the response of an exogenous shock to the interest rate on
foreign funds, the other papers use an approach which is similar to Fisher (1933)’s Debt-
Deflation theory. The underlying mechanism relates the economy’s costs (or access) of
credits with the economy’s level of external debt relative to its assets. In these models, the
crisis occurs when the economy is hit by an adverse shock which triggers the borrowing
constraint to bind. As a result, the economy is forced to repay parts of its outstanding
external debt (financial leveraging). In a mismatch situation between the currency de-
nomination of income, assets, and liabilities, the associated real depreciation increases
the output value of outstanding debt, particularly, of the non-tradable goods sector whose
income is in local-currency. The associated reduction in net wealth increases in turn the
economy’s real financial burden and worsens its access to external finance.
The present model is most related to the limited participation model of Christiano,
Gust, and Roldos (2004). The representative firm produces tradable and non-tradable
goods subject to working capital constraints on labor and imports. In addition, the firm
can borrow external foreign-currency denominated funds to finance investment. There
are, however, three main differences. First, we do not model the financial shock in the
form of a binding borrowing constraint, rather we incorporate the shock in a debt-elastic
risk premium on external long-term debt. In addition, the financial shock is allowed to
be correlated with the risks associated with domestic bank loans and external short-term
credits for imports. Second, not only the household is surprised by the financial shock, but
also the firm which decides on production at the beginning of the period before the shock
is realized. And third, we estimate the structural parameters of the model by matching
theoretical with empirical impulse responses resulting from a VAR model. Our results
show that the proposed model reproduces closely the dynamics of the LA-5 countries in
response to adverse shocks to the country risk premium. Our framework also highlights
that initially small financial shocks can be amplified and result in substantial sudden stops,
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especially, when the economy inherits high levels of external foreign-currency debt and
low levels of foreign-currency income.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we discuss the
theoretical model. In Section 4.3, we present the estimation results of the VAR analysis,
the implied empirical impulse responses, and the simulation results of the theoretical
model using the estimated structural parameters. The final section concludes.
4.2 The theoretical model
This section describes an economic environment that is characteristic for emerging mar-
ket economies: a small open economy (SOE) borrows on international capital markets in
foreign currency. In our environment, unexpected financial shocks originating in interna-
tional capital markets may occur and affect the domestic real economy. To analyze the
transmission mechanism of these shocks, we consider a SOE version of a cash-in-advance
(CIA) model with limited participation augmented with a financial friction in the form of
a debt-elastic risk premium on external funds.3 The theoretical framework is most related
to Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2004) who consider a SOE which is inhabited by four
types of agents: household, firm, financial intermediary, and monetary authority. The
representative firm produces tradable and non-tradable goods subject to working capital
constraints on labor and imported materials. In addition to the two types of short-term
credits for the prepayment of labor and imports, the firm can borrow on international cap-
ital markets long-term credits to finance investment. The international financial shock
is modeled as an exogenous, adverse shock to the risk premium on external long-term
credits. By the model’s uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition, the shock is associated
with a currency depreciation and is amplified by an adverse balance sheet effect and a
’fundamentals-related’ increase in the risk premium on external long-term credits. Our
framework also allows for correlations between the risks of the three types of credits,
and it captures therefore the possibility of financial market contagion (Baig and Goldfajn
(1999)).
3For a detailed description of CIA models, see Christiano (1991), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992),
and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997).
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4.2.1 Household
A representative household derives life-time utility from a composite consumption good
Ct and disutility from labor Lt:
U = Et
∞∑
j=0
βjU(Ct+j, Lt+j), (4.1)
where
U(Ct, Lt) =
(Ct − L
µ
t
µ
Cγt )
1−σ − 1
1− σ , µ > 0, σ > 0, σ 6= 1, γ ≥ 0, (4.2)
and Et is the expectations operator conditional on time t information. The preferences
include as a special case (γ = 0) the preferences proposed by Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Huffman (1988), which rule out wealth effects on the labor supply. We incorporate
this type of preferences to control for the strength of the wealth effect by choosing γ. The
composite consumption good consists of a domestic tradable and a non-tradable good:
Ct = (n
1
λC
λ−1
λ
Tt + (1− n)
1
λC
λ−1
λ
Nt )
λ
λ−1 , 0 < n < 1, λ > 0, (4.3)
where n is the share of tradable goods in composite consumption and λ the constant
elasticity of substitution between the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods.
At the beginning of period t, the consumer receives the entire money stock from the
previous period Mt−1, gets prepaid paychecks WtLt, and deposits a cash amount Dt with
the financial intermediary. The CIA constraint requires that all consumption expenditures
must be paid with cash available at the beginning of period t:
PtCt ≤Mt−1 −Dt +WtLt, (4.4)
where Pt denotes the price index for the composite consumption good given by:
Pt = (nP
1−λ
Tt + (1− n)P 1−λNt )
1
1−λ . (4.5)
Maximizing composite consumption subject to total expenditures with respect to the con-
sumption of tradable and non-tradable goods, we obtain the demand functions for trad-
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ables and non-tradables:
CTt = n
(
PTt
Pt
)−λ
Ct, (4.6)
CNt = (1− n)
(
PNt
Pt
)−λ
Ct, (4.7)
both are decreasing in the ratio of the good’s price to the overall price index Pit/Pt, for
i = T,N .
The budget constraint of the consumer who owns the firm and bank reflects the evo-
lution of her assets: the cash at the beginning of period t + 1 is equal to the sum of net
dividends that she receives from the firm (piFt ) and the financial intermediary (pi
B
t ), inter-
est earnings and repayed deposits loaned to the financial intermediary at the beginning of
the period (RDtDt), and any cash that is left from financing consumption expenditures:
Mt = pi
F
t + pi
B
t +RDtDt + (Mt−1 −Dt +WtLt − PtCt). (4.8)
The household maximizes its life-time utility (eq.(4.1)) subject to the CIA (eq.(4.4))
and budget (eq.(4.8)) constraints. A period’s deposit decision is made before the financial
shock occurs, while the decisions on consumption and labor supply are made afterward.
The Euler equation associated with the labor decision implies that in the optimum
the consumer chooses consumption and labor such that the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure is equal to their relative price:
UCt
ULt
= − Pt
Wt
. (4.9)
The intertemporal Euler equation associated with the deposit decision implies that
marginal utility of consumption (or equivalently marginal utility of leisure) is equal be-
tween two consecutive periods:
Etβ
UCt+1
Pt+1
=
UCt
RDtPt
. (4.10)
4.2.2 Firm
The international financial shock affects the economy through the corporate sector. The
representative firm produces two types of goods, tradables and non-tradables, using labor
Lt, capital Kt, and imported materials IMt as input factors. We assume that the firm has
access to three types of credits. It borrows at the beginning of period t domestic short-
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term credits, BLt, from the financial intermediary to hire labor (bank loans), and foreign
short-term credits, SFt, to prepay imported materials (trade credits). The firm repays
these loans including interest payments at the end of the period. In addition, we assume
that the firm can borrow foreign long-term credits, FLt, that have to be repayed at the
beginning of the next period. These credits are used to finance investment. We assume
that external debt is denominated in foreign currency, which is in line with the Original Sin
theory (Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2002)). Opposed to Christiano, Gust, and
Roldos (2004), we assume that the firm decides on production at the beginning of period
t, i.e. before the financial shock is realized, to capture that employment and investment
decisions take time to plan. The timing in our model can be represented as follows:
0 1 t
HH‘s Deposit Decision
Firm‘s Production Decision
Financial Shock
HH‘s Consumption Decision
It implies that the consumer decides on deposits and the firm on production, before the
financial shock occurs. After the financial shock is realized at the end of the period t, the
household makes its consumption decision and prices adjust such that all markets clear.
The production function of tradable and non-tradable goods is given by:
YTt = ATtK
αT
Tt−1(IM
ν
t L
1−ν
T t )
1−αT , 0 < αT < 1, 0 < ν < 1, (4.11)
YNt = ANtK
αN
Nt−1L
1−αN
Nt , 0 < αN < 1, (4.12)
where ATt and ANt denote stationary AR(1) technology processes.4 Note that αi denotes
the capital share in the production of each good and ν(1 − αT ) the import share in the
production of tradable goods. The labor shares in the production of tradables and non-
tradables are given by (1− ν)(1− αT ) and (1− αN), respectively. The firm accumulates
two types of capital stocks:
Kit = Iit + (1− δ)Kit−1, i = T,N, (4.13)
where Iit denotes investment in period t and 0 < δ < 1 the rate of capital depreciation.
We assume that changes in the stock of capital are subject to quadratic capital adjustment
4Note that all stochastic shock processes are presented in Section 4.2.6.
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costs:
AC(Kit, Kit−1) =
γi
2
(
Kit − (1− δ)Kit−1
Kit−1
)2
Kit−1, i = T,N, (4.14)
with an adjustment cost parameter denoted by γi ≥ 0.
The firm starts each period with no cash, because all profits from the previous period
are paid to the household. Implied by the assumption of advance-payments of labor and
imports, the firm borrows domestic bank loans (BLt) to hire labor, and foreign trade (SFt
credits to prepay imported materials. In particular, the working capital constraints faced
by the firm are given by:
BLt ≥ WtLTt +WtLNt, (4.15)
SFt ≥ p∗IMtIMt, (4.16)
where p∗IMt denotes the price of imported materials expressed in foreign currency. Since
domestic bank loans and foreign trade credits have to be repaid including interest pay-
ments at the end of each period, the effective costs of labor and imported materials in
domestic currency are equal to RFtWtLt and etRStp∗IMtIMt, respectively. The nominal
exchange rate et is denoted as the domestic price per unit of foreign currency and de-
termined by the model’s UIP condition (eq.4.27). RFt denotes the gross interest rate on
domestic bank loans and RSt that of trade credits. We assume that RSt is equal to the
risk-free interest rate on external long-term credits, 1 + r, in the deterministic steady state
following a stationary AR(1) process:
RSt = (1− ρRS)(1 + r) + ρRSRSt−1 + ε˜St. (4.17)
The gross interest rate on foreign long-term credits RFFt is composed of a risk-free com-
ponent and a risk premium:
RFFt = (1 + r) + κ(exp(etFLt − e¯FL)− 1) +RPt, κ ≥ 0. (4.18)
The risk premium consists of a ’fundamentals-related’ component, which increases with
the firm’s financial burden, and an ’international’ component RPt, which is assumed to
follow a stationary AR(1) process. The specification is based on Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2003) with the difference that our specification takes into account financial amplifier ef-
fects of exchange rate depreciations. Note that e¯FL denotes the steady state level of
foreign long-term credits denominated in domestic currency, and that the risk premium is
equal to zero in the deterministic steady state. We assume that the SOE is hit by the inter-
national financial shock in the form of an unexpected, adverse shock to the risk premium
RPt.
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The firm’s optimization problem is to maximize the expected, discounted sum of fu-
ture profits by choice of LTt, LNt, KTt, KNt, IMt, BLt, SFt, and FLt. Assuming that
the firm is surprised by the financial shock, it solves the following optimization problem
based on the information set of period t− 1:
max
LTt,LNt,KTt,KNt,IMt,BLt,SFtFLt
Et−1
∞∑
j=0
ρt,t+jpi
F
t+j, (4.19)
where
piFt = PTtYTt + PNtYNt −WtLTt −WtLNt − etp∗IMtIMt
−PTtITt − PTtAC(KTt, KTt−1)− PNtINt (4.20)
−PNtAC(KNt, KNt−1) +BLt −RFtBLt
+etSFt − etRStSFt + etFLt − etRFFt−1FLt−1,
subject to the working capital constraints described above (eqs.(4.15)-(4.16)). We assume
that goods and labor markets are perfectly competitive which implies that the firm acts as
a price taker.
The optimality conditions with respect to labor in the production of tradable and non-
tradable goods imply that expected effective marginal costs of labor are equal to their
expected marginal products:
Et−1RFtWt = (1− αT )(1− ν)Et−1PTtYTt
LTt
, (4.21)
Et−1RFtWt = (1− αN)Et−1PNtYNt
LNt
. (4.22)
The intertemporal optimality condition with respect to capital in the production of
both types of goods equates the expected costs and expected benefits of an additional unit
of capital:
Et−1(1 + γ
Iit
Kit−1
) = Et−1ρt,t+1
(
αi
Yit+1
Kit
+ (1− δ)− γ Iit+1
Kit
(
1
2
Iit+1
Kit
− Kit+1
Kit
))
,
(4.23)
for i = T,N . Expected benefits on the right side are equal to the expected marginal
product of an additional unit of capital, its resale value after capital depreciation, and
associated capital adjustment costs. The costs in the current period are given by the unit
of investment and associated capital adjustment costs.
The optimality condition with respect to imported materials implies that expected
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effective marginal costs are equal to the expected marginal product:
Et−1etRStp∗IMt = (1− αT )νEt−1
PTtYTt
IMt
. (4.24)
The intertemporal optimality condition with respect to external long-term credits
equates expected benefits and expected costs of an additional unit of long-term foreign
funds:
Et−1et = Et−1ρt,t+1et+1(RFFt +
∂RFFt
∂FLt
FLt), (4.25)
∂RFFt
∂FLt
= κexp(etFLt − e¯FL)et.
Expected costs on the right side are equal to the sum of repayment of interests and
principle of an additional unit of foreign credits and its effect on the risk premium.
Since firm profits are distributed to the household at the end of the period, the firm’s
discount factor is equal to the subjective discount factor of the household:
ρt,t+j = β
j Pt
Pt+j
UCt+j
UCt
. (4.26)
Using the expression for the firm’s discount factor and combining the household’s and
firm’s intertemporal optimal conditions (eqs.(4.10) and (4.25)), we obtain the model’s UIP
condition:
Et−1RDt = Et−1
et+1
et
(
RFFt +
∂RFFt
∂FLt
FLt
)
. (4.27)
This condition differs from the usual UIP condition in two aspects: it includes a risk
premium term (the second term on the right side) and it holds only in expectations condi-
tioned on information at the end of period t − 1. The risk premium term stems from the
fact that the interest rate on external long-term credits incorporates the debt-elastic risk
premium. Note that with a positive level of foreign long-term debt, the domestic interest
rate exceeds the foreign interest rate in the deterministic steady state and is given by:
R¯D = R¯FF + κe¯FL. (4.28)
The associated level of foreign debt in steady state is then equal to e¯FL = 1/β−(1+r)
κ
.
The model’s UIP condition is consistent with Lewis (1995) who finds empirical evidence
for the existence of predicted interest rate differentials between home and foreign bonds
which can be explained by differences in country risks. Moreover, realized and predicted
interest rate differentials can deviate due to expectation errors. In our model, the actual
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and predicted interest rate differentials coincide as long as there are no unexpected shocks
in periods t and t+ 1. If an unexpected shock occurs, the model’s UIP condition deviates
from the usual UIP condition in the initial period.
4.2.3 Financial Intermediary and Monetary Authority
The financial intermediary receives deposits, at the beginning of each period, and repays
RDtDt at the end of each period. Moreover, the financial intermediary lends, at the be-
ginning of the period, bank loans to the firm, and receives RFtBLt at the end of the same
period. Moreover, we assume that the financial intermediary has a second source of funds
measured by the change in domestic liquidity, Mt−Mt−1. Although a monetary authority
could be introduced here, we abstract from monetary policy and assume that domestic liq-
uidity follows a stationary AR(1) process that is subject to ’domestic’ and ’international’
liquidity shocks. The financial intermediary solves the following problem:
max
Dt,BLt
= Et
∞∑
j=0
ρt,t+jpi
B
t+j, (4.29)
s.t.
piBt = Mt −Mt−1 +Dt −RDtDt −BLt +RFtBLt, (4.30)
BLt = Dt +Mt −Mt−1, (4.31)
where eq.(4.31) represents the bank’s balance sheet identity.
In equilibrium, the intermediation margin between bank loans and deposits is zero:
RFt −RDt = 0. (4.32)
4.2.4 Rest of the World
The rest of the world supplies imports, which are employed in the production of trad-
able goods. We assume that imports are producer-currency priced, and that the supply is
increasing in the price of imports p∗IMt:
IMt = ZIM(p
∗
IMt)
φIM , ZIM > 0, φIM > 0, (4.33)
where ZIM is a positive scaling parameter and φIM the price elasticity of supply.
The rest of the world imports tradable goods produced in the SOE. In particular, we
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assume that exports of the SOE are producer-currency priced and that export demand is
decreasing in the price of tradable goods:
C∗t = ZT (
1
et
pTt)
−φT , ZT > 0, φT > 0, (4.34)
where ZT , analogously, is a positive scaling parameter and −φT the price elasticity of the
foreign demand for tradables.5
4.2.5 Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing condition for non-tradable goods is given by:
YNt = CNt + INt + ACNt, (4.35)
and that for tradable goods by:
YTt = CTt + ITt + ACTt + C
∗
t . (4.36)
These two conditions equate production to absorption.
The market clearing condition for labor is:
LTt + LNt = Lt. (4.37)
Combining the household’s and firm’s cash constraints with the financial intermedi-
ary’s balance sheet identity, the money market clearing condition corresponds to:
Mt = PtCt. (4.38)
This condition requires that actual cash balances equal desired cash balances.
The consolidated budget constraint of the whole economy results from combining the
household’s budget constraint with those of the firm and the financial intermediary:
(PTtYTt − PTtCTt − PTtITt − PTtACTt) + (PNtYNt − PNtCNt
−PNtINt − PNtACNt) + (WtLt −WtLTt −WtLNt)
−etp∗IMtIMt − et(RSt − 1)SFt − et(RFFt−1 − 1)FLt−1 = −et(FLt − FLt−1).(4.39)
5The assumption of producer-currency pricing implies that the firm sells tradable goods for the same
price on the domestic and foreign market, and that foreign demand increases with an exchange rate depre-
ciation, depending on the demand elasticity. Since SOEs typically sell commodities for which prices are
given, we restrict the elasticity to be small.
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Using the market clearing conditions for goods and labor, the consolidated budget con-
straint reduces to:
PTtC
∗
Tt − etp∗IMtIMt − et(RSt − 1)SFt − et(RFFt−1 − 1)FLt−1 = −et(FLt − FLt−1),
(4.40)
and the economy’s trade balance is given by:
TBt = PTtC
∗
Tt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exports
− etp∗IMtIMt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Imports
. (4.41)
Using the definition of the trade balance, the consolidated budget constraint can be ex-
pressed as:
TBt − et(RSt − 1)SFt − et(RFFt−1 − 1)FLt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Current Account
= −et(FLt − FLt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Capital Account
. (4.42)
This condition represents the economy’s balance of payments condition, which requires
that the current account (sum of the trade balance and net foreign interest payments) is
equal to the negative of the capital account (change in net foreign assets).
4.2.6 Stochastic Shocks
The economy faces five stochastic shocks, to be more precise, two real and three financial
shocks. Our main focus is set on the transmission of the international financial shock to
the risk premium on external long-term credits, RPt. The financial shocks are allowed to
be correlated with each other, but not with the real shocks.6 In particular, we assume that
the financial shock to the risk premium on foreign long-term credits is persistent following
a stationary AR(1) process:
RPt = ρRPRPt−1 + εRPt, εRPt ∼ N(0, σ2RP ). (4.43)
The interest rate on foreign short-term credits is assumed to be autoregressive and to be
subject to financial shocks:
RSt = (1− ρS)(1 + r) + ρSRSt−1 + ε˜St, (4.44)
ε˜St = εSt + εISt, εit ∼ N(0, σ2i ), i = S, IS.
We assume that shocks to the interest rate on foreign short-term credits, ε˜St, consist
6In the baseline case, which is considered here, we abstract from correlations of financial shocks.
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of a component (εSt) that is uncorrelated with the financial shock to foreign long-term
credits (εRPt), and a component (εISt) that is correlated with the external financial shock.
Domestic liquidity is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process in logs:
lnMt = ρM lnMt−1 + ε˜Mt, (4.45)
ε˜Mt = εMt + εIt, εit ∼ N(0, σ2i ), i = M, IM. (4.46)
As in the case of short-term credits, ε˜Mt denotes a composed shock consisting of
a ’domestic’ liquidity shock (εMt) that is uncorrelated with εRPt, and an ’international’
liquidity shock (εIt) that is correlated with the external financial shock.
Finally, technology in both sectors is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process in
logs:
lnAit = ρAilnAit−1 + εAit, εAit ∼ N(0, σ2i ), i = T,N. (4.47)
The stationarity assumptions imply that the autoregressive coefficients, ρi, i =
AT,AN,M, S, and RP , are smaller than 1 in modulus.
4.2.7 Equilibrium
A rational expectations equilibrium of the whole economy is a set of processes for
{Ct,CTt,CNt,LTt,LNt, Lt,IMt,KTt,KNt,ITt,INt,YTt,YNt, ρt,t+1,PTt,PNt,Pt,p∗IMt,Wt,C∗t ,
Dt,BLt,SFt, FLt,RDt,RFt,RSt,RFFt}∞t=0, having the following properties: (1) for each
time period and given prices, the quantities solve the optimization problems of the house-
hold, firm, and the financial intermediary, and (2) all markets clear. We solve the model
by linearizing the equilibrium conditions around the deterministic steady state and solve
the linearized system using numerical methods. In Section 4.3, we discuss the choice of
parameter values and investigate the impulse responses to the external financial shock.
4.2.8 Transmission mechanisms of the financial shock
In the following, we describe qualitatively the transmission of the international financial
shock for a particular set of structural parameters which are set to satisfy certain long-run
ratios of the LA-5 economies and to match the empirical impulse responses as discussed
in the next section.7 We focus hereby on the description of the baseline case, which rules
out correlations between the financial risks.
7The parameters are shown in Table 4.2, and the impulse responses of the model variables are shown in
Figures 4.3 and 4.4.
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Initially, after having decided on its production, the firm faces an unexpected rise in the
costs of borrowing external long-term credits by the magnitude of the exogenous shock
to the risk premium. The assumption, that the household’s deposit and firm’s production
decisions are made before the shock occurs, implies that all other variables are unaffected
in the initial period. In particular, the domestic interest rate does not react, because the
household’s deposit decision and the firm’s demand for domestic bank loans are prede-
termined. The usual UIP condition is violated, because the model’s UIP condition holds
only in expecations (eq. 4.27). Since there is no predicted interest rate differential, the
exchange rate is expected to remain constant and no actual currency depreciation occurs.
Overall, only the foreign interest rate changes in the initial period without affecting other
prices and quantities.
In the next period, the firm reduces ceteris paribus external borrowing implied by the
inital financial shock. Given the domestic interest rate rises less than the foreign interest
rate, the UIP condition implies a currency depreciation which is followed by an expected
appreciation. The currency depreciation in turn results in an adverse balance sheet effect
by increasing the domestic value of external debt. For a given level of external debt, the
depreciation leads to an increase in the risk premium on long-term credits and the firm
reduces further new borrowing. The firm faces contrasting effects on operating profits in
the form of increasing costs of imports and increasing earnings from exports. Moreover,
the firm responds to the increase in the costs of investment and imports, by increasing
labor demand in the tradable goods sector. Given the higher demand for tradables, caused
by the increase in the demand for exports, the firm finds it optimal to reallocate resources
from the non-tradable to the tradable good sector. Other things equal, the financial shock
translates into a negative wealth effect for the househould as dividend payments from
the firm decrease. To compensate the adverse wealth effect, the household increases its
labor supply only if γ > 0. In our case with γ = 0, employment is fully determined by
the firm’s labor demand falling below its steady state level. For our set of parameters,
production drops persistently in both sectors and prices increase.
4.3 Econometric and calibration results
In this section, we investigate the empirical impulse responses (IRFs) of particular
emerging-market fundamentals to a country risk premium shock resulting from a struc-
tural panel vector-autoregressive (VAR) model. Moreover, the empirical IRFs are
matched with the theoretical IRFs by minimizing their weighted distance as a function
of particular structural parameters of the theoretical model.
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4.3.1 Econometric results
The quarterly data covers the period from 1994 to 2007 and includes the LA-5 countries:
Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. The variables entering the VAR system
are GDP, investment, trade balance, domestic bank credits, and J.P. Morgan’s EMBI+
country spread.8 The EMBI+ is a composite index of different liquid dollar-denominated
debt instruments such as Brady bonds, Eurobonds, and traded loans by sovereign entities,
and we use it as a measure for the country risk premium of external funds. Note that
the underlying approach follows closely Uribe and Yue (2006) who analyze the effects of
country spread shocks on business cycles in EM economies. The main differences are the
choice of variables in the VAR system and the estimation method.9
The empirical model takes the form of a first-order VAR system:10
Axt = Bxt−1 + εt (4.48)
A =

1 0 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0 0
a31 a32 1 0 0
a41 a42 a43 1 0
a51 a52 a53 a54 1
 , xt =

yjt
ijt
tbjt
cjt
rjt
 , εt =

εyjt
εijt
εtbjt
εcjt
εrjt
 ,
where t refers to the time dimension and j to cross-sections. Moreover, yjt denotes real
GDP, ijt real investment, tbjt the trade balance to GDP ratio, cjt real domestic credits,
and rjt the country spread.11 Output, investment, and domestic credits are expressed in
log-deviations from their log-linear trend. Moreover, all variables except for domestic
credits and the country spread are seasonally adjusted. The included variables represent
important macroeconomic aggregates describing EM-fundamentals, and they have been
identified in the literature as being highly related to EM country spreads (Uribe and Yue
(2006) and Tornell and Westermann (2003)). Our key interest hereby is to investigate
whether our theoretical model is able to reproduce the economies’ trajectory in response
to a country risk premium shock of 5% per quarter (p.q.).
The structural shock to the country risk is identified by imposing restrictions on the
8A more detailed description of the data sources and definitions can be found in the Appendix.
9As Uribe and Yue (2006), we use a five-variable VAR system. The only difference is that we include do-
mestic credits instead of the US interest rate. As the authors, we estimate the system equation-by-equation,
but use the system GMM estimator instead of the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
10We estimate the VAR model for the lag lengths {1, 2, 3, 4} and calculate the corresponding Schwarz
information criteria on lag order selection which are equal to {−34.69,−34.98,−34.68,−34.31}, respec-
tively. Since they are of equal magnitude, we select the most parsimonious specification with one lag.
11Real variables are calculated by dividing the particular variable with the GDP deflator.
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matrix A, that is, by restrictions on the contemporaneous effect of the financial shock.
Note that the restrictions reflect the relation between the considered variables implied
by the theoretical model.12 The identification scheme implies that innovations in the
country spread affect the real variables with one-period lag, and that innovations in the
real variables affect the country spread contemporaneously. As Uribe and Yue (2006), we
are convinced that the identification strategy is reasonable since decisions on employment,
consumption, and investment take time to plan and to be implemented. Equally, it seems
reasonable to assume that financial markets react more rapidly to changes in the state of
the economy. It is important to note that we are only interested in identifying the structural
shock to the country risk premium. There are no restrictions on the coefficient matrix B.
A difficulty that arises from the specification of the empirical model is an endogeneity
problem between the dependent variables and their lags, and the first-differences of the
contemporaneous variables and those of the error term. To account for this problem, we
estimate the VAR system (eq. 4.48) equation-by-equation using the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimator for dynamic panel data (Arellano and Bover (1995)). The
estimation results are reported in Table 4.1. The AR(2) tests indicate that there is no
incidence of autocorrelation in the level equations. Most of the estimated coefficients
show the expected signs. In particular, the variables are positively autocorrelated with
autoregressive coefficients between 0.72 and 0.91. With a lag, output and domestic credits
decrease significantly in response to an increase in the country spread. Investment and
the trade balance do not react significantly to the lag of the country risk premium, rather
the effect is transmitted through the lagged decline in GDP, which significantly affects
investment in the same period. In return, the implied adverse response of investment
leads to an increase of the trade balance in that period.
Based on the moving average representation of the VAR system, we calculate the IRFs
to a country spread shock of 5% (p.q.). The results are shown in Figure 4.2. The dotted
lines indicate 10% and 90% bootstrap intervals based on 1000 replications of estima-
tion.13 In response to the innovation in the country spread, the country spread increases
and reverses steadily toward zero. The half life of the country spread response is approx-
imately one year and a quarter. Output, investment, and credits respond negatively with a
lag to the country spread shock. The trade balance improves with a lag indicating that do-
mestic absorption deteriorates more than domestic output. The IRFs of the trade balance,
12In an earlier version of this model, the variables responded contemporaneously to the risk premium
shock. In order to be able to identify the structural financial shock using this VAR specification, we imposed
that the firm decides on production before the financial shock realizes.
13More precisely, in each replication we generate artifical data using the estimated coefficients and re-
sampled residuals of the original VAR system, and re-estimate the VAR system and the corresponding IRFs.
The bootstrap intervals are the 10th and 90th percentile of the resulting distribution of IRFs.
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however, are not significant, since the zeroline lies within the bootstrap interval. Another
finding is that output and the trade balance recover generally faster than investment and
domestic credits. Investment decreases approximately by 15% from trend after 2 years,
while output drops by 8% from trend after 1 year. The trade balance improves by approx-
imately 2% of GDP, and domestic credits decrease by 10% from trend. While output, the
trade balance, and the country risk premium recover after about 7 years, the recovery of
the investment and domestic credits takes 10 years.
4.3.2 Calibration results
In the next step, we match the empirical IRFs with those implied by the theoretical model
as a function of a set of structural parameters. Two groups of model parameters have to
be distinguished.
The first group contains parameters for which values are chosen such that our econ-
omy satisfies certain long-run characteristics in the steady state that are in line with the
empirical evidence on EMs and the related literature. In particular, the economy’s impa-
tience measured by the discount factor β is set to 0.95 implying an annualized domestic
interest rate of about 20%. Moreover, we set r = 0.01 which implies an annual risk-free
foreign interest rate of 4%. We restrict the parameters {n, αT , ν, αN , δ} such that the trad-
able goods sector makes up about 40% of overall production following Ruhl and Kehoe
(2007) and Arellano and Mendoza (2003). In particular, the share of tradable goods in
composite consumption is set to n = 0.3 and the rate of capital depreciation to δ = 0.026
implying an annual rate of 10%. As Christiano, Gust, and Roldos (2004), we assume
that tradable production is more capital intensive and we set αT = 0.4 and αN = 0.3.
Moreover, we set the import parameter in tradable production to be equal to ν = 0.3
which implies a share of imports in overall production of 7% and a share of wage income
of 54%. The financial friction parameter is set to κ = 0.04 which results in a steady
state ratio of external long-term debt to annual production of 20%.14 Overall, this set of
parameters implies that the trade balance to GDP ratio is equal to 1% in the steady state.
Finally, the household’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is set to
σ = 1.001, and its intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor supply to 2 implying
µ = 1.45 as in Mendoza (1991) and Uribe and Yue (2006).
The second group of parameters includes the remaining structural parameters and
those describing the stochastic processes. These parameters are allowed to vary on a fixed
interval and are estimated by matching the IRFs. The structural parameters include the
14For instance Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia had net external debt to GDP ratios between 20-40% prior
to their crises based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).
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capital adjustment cost parameters, γT and γN , the elasticities of imports and exports φIM
and φT , the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables λ, and the pref-
erence parameter γ which controls for wealth effects on labor supply. The parameters of
the stochastic processes consist of the autoregressive coefficients (ρRP , ρS, ρM , ρAT , ρAN )
and the variances and covariances of the stochastic shocks. In the baseline case, how-
ever, we estimate only the parameters of the financial shock process of long-term credits
(ρRP , σRP ) and set the parameters of the other shock processes to zero.
The empirical and theoretical IRFs are matched by minimizing a measure of the dis-
tance between the empirical IRFs, IRe, stemming from the VAR analysis and the cor-
responding theoretical IRFs, IRt. The theoretical counterparts of the VAR variables
are real output (PTYT + PNYN)/P , real investment (PT IT + PNIN)/P , trade balance
over production TB/PY , real domestic bank loans BL/P , and the risk premium on
foreign long-term credits RFF − (1 + r). We match 20 quarters of the impulse re-
sponses of each variable by minimizing the following distance function with respect to
ξ = (γT , γN , φIM , φT , λ, γ, ρRP , σRP ):
min
ξ
[IRe − IRt(ξ)]′Σ−1[IRe − IRt(ξ)], (4.49)
subject to ξ ≤ ξ ≤ ξ.15 The weighting matrix Σ−1 is calculated as the inverse of the
covariance matrix of the IRFs resulting from the 1000 bootstrap replications. The starting
values of the parameters ξ are set according to the related literature and actual data (Ruhl
and Kehoe (2007) and Arellano and Mendoza (2003)). Table 4.2 shows the starting val-
ues, interval bands, and the resulting parameters. Most of the estimated coefficients lie
well inside the interval band, with the exception of the elasticity of substitution between
the consumption of tradables and non-tradables and the wealth parameter in the utility
function, which converge to their boundaries, i.e. λ = 0.1 and γ = 0. The size of the
exogenous financial shock εRP is estimated to be 1%. Figure 4.3 compares the empirical
IRFs with those resulting from the model. Most of the points belonging to the theoretical
IRFs lie inside the bootstrapped confidence intervals. Although we estimate only 8 pa-
rameters to match 100 points of impulse responses, the theoretical model reproduces the
qualitative features of the empirical IRFs described above reasonably well: output, invest-
ment, and domestic credits drop, while the trade balance improves. The initial responses
of the trade balance and investment, however, are overestimated. On the contrary, output
and domestic credits do not react as much as in the VAR model.16 Over time, theoretical
15The constrained nonlinear minimization is done numerically. The convergence criterion, i.e. the change
in the distance, is set to 10−4.
16We have done the estimations allowing for a correlation between the international financial shock and
the shock to domestic liquidity. The estimated correlation turned out to be negative improving the overall
fit of the model.
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and empirical IRFs get closer. To check our model, we investigate the responses of other
particularly important model variables, see Figure 4.4. Interest rates are shown in per-
centage points and the other variables in percent deviations from steady state. All model
variables respond as expected. The interest rate RFFt increases by about 3 percentage
points, mainly, driven by the fundamentals-related component. The associated currency
depreciation amounts to 60%. External long-term credits decrease by approximately 2%
returning to the pre-shock level after about 4 years. Associated with this are drops in
investments and imports (-20%), and an increase in exports by about 30% (equivalent to
3.2% of tradable production). The capital stock in the tradable sector drops by 4% and
in the non-tradable sector by 2%. Moreover, labor is shifted from the non-tradable (-8%)
to the tradable goods sector (+10%) as earnings from exports increase. As a result, the
shock leads to a decline in total output of 3%, while the drop in the tradable goods sector
is smaller (-2%), than in the non-tradable goods sector (-5%). Total consumption drops by
4% which is dominated by a decrease in the consumption of tradable goods (-5%) caused
by the increase in exports.
Summing up, the model reproduces the qualitative and quantitative features of the
empirical IRFs. The initial risk premium shock is amplified by the currency depreciation
and results in important contractions in economic activity and domestic absorption. Most
of the 100 points belonging to the theoretical impulse responses of output, investment,
trade balance, domestic credits, and country risk premium lie inside the bootstrapped
confidence interval, except for the initial periods.
4.4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to investigate, from the perspective of EM economies, the
transmission and amplification mechanisms of unexpected international financial shocks
in the presence of foreign-currency denominated corporate debt. In particular, we devel-
oped a cash-in-advance model with limited participation and matched the implied impulse
responses with empirical impulse responses of 5 Latin American economies.
There are two main results. First, the theoretical model reproduces the qualitative
and quantitative features of the empirical IRFs by the estimation of a parsimonious set
of parameters. Second, the resulting implications with regard to the transmission of the
international financial shock are the following: The financial shock enters initially the
risk premium of foreign credits. Given domestic interest rates, the exchange rate depre-
ciates, and the real effects of the initial shock are amplified by an adverse balance sheet
effect and a ’fundamentals-related’ increase in the risk premium of foreign credits. The
financial amplifier effects are more pronounced in economies with high levels of foreign-
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currency debt and low levels of foreign-currency income, because the associated exchange
rate depreciation is larger, when a large stock of external debt has to be adjusted. In our
framework, the capital account dominates the balance of payments, and the current ac-
count has to adjust. The involved reduction in foreign capital, is partly offset by a shift
of resources from the non-tradable to the tradable goods sector, and the associated export
expansion counteracts the reduction in imports. When the financial shock is associated
with a liquidity shortage in the banking sector, then the output drop is amplified.
The theoretical framework allows to explore monetary policy responses to interna-
tional financial shocks, but we leave this to future work. Monetary policy faces a difficult
task, when the financial shock occurs: If the monetary authority injects additional liquid-
ity to the banking sector, this reduces the domestic interest rate, but increases the currency
depreciation. On the contrary, if the monetary authority increases the domestic interest
rate, it counteracts the associated exchange rate depreciation, but deteriorates domestic
financial conditions (fear of floating). Ultimately, the optimal policy response depends on
the degree of foreign-currency debt relative to the economy’s foreign-currency income.
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4.5 Appendix
Data
The data consists of quarterly data for 5 Latin American economies: Brazil, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. The sample periods vary from country to coun-
try: Brazil 1995:1-2007:4, Colombia 1994:1-2007:4, Ecuador 1995:2-2002:1, Mexico
1994:1-2007:4, and Peru 1994:1-2007:4. Totally, the dataset includes 203 observations.
Quarterly series for GDP, gross domestic investment, trade balance, and domestic
credits are from IMF’s International Financial Statistics. GDP, investment, and trade bal-
ance are seasonally adjusted. GDP, investment, and domestic credits are deflated using
the GDP deflator. Because of lack of the series for GDP deflator for Brazil, we use the
CPI series instead. For the country spread series, we used J.P. Morgan EMBI+ stripped
spread from the database ’Datastream’. We expressed GDP, investment, and domestic
credits as log deviations from a log-linear trend, and the trade balance ratio as a ratio of
nominal trade balance to nominal GDP.
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Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Results of the panel VAR estimation
Estimation method: System GMM
Independent variable Dependent variables:a
yt it tbt ct rt
yt – 1.18∗∗ 0.08 0.05 -0.14
yt−1 0.72∗∗∗ -0.89 -0.01 -0.27∗∗∗ 0.12
it – – -0.16∗∗ -0.02 0.01
it−1 0.08∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.11 -0.03
tbt – – – 0.43 0.24∗∗∗
tbt−1 0.28∗∗∗ 0.09 0.91∗∗∗ -0.39 -0.19∗∗
ct – – – – 0.06
ct−1 -0.02∗ 0.01 0.01 0.91∗∗∗ -0.03
rt – – – – –
rt−1 -0.15∗∗ -0.08 0.01 -0.22∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
Observations 203 203 203 203 203
AR(2) 0.62 0.64 0.36 0.20 0.27
a Note that (∗∗∗,∗∗,∗) indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The included countries
are Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. The constant is not reported.
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Table 4.2: Structural parameters and steady state ratios
Parameter Starting Interval Estimation Description
value result
β 0.95 time preference
µ 1.45 consumption-labor in utility
σ 1.001 intertemporal EoS
n 0.3 share of CT in C
λ 0.14 [0.1,0.2] 0.1 EoS between CN and CT
γ 0 [0,0.5] 0 disutility of labor
αT 0.3 capital share in YT
αN 0.4 capital share in YN
δ 0.028 capital depreciation
r 0.01 risk-free interest rate
κ 0.04 risk premium parameter
ν 0.3 share of imports in YT
γT 0 [0,20] 16.97 KT adjustment costs
γN 0 [0,20] 4.26 KN adjustment costs
ZIM 0.1 import supply parameter
ZT 0.1 export demand parameter
φIM 0.7 [0.5,0.9] 0.84 price elasticity of import supply
φT 0.7 [0.6,0.8] 0.68 price elasticity of export demand
σRP 0.03 [0,0.03] 0.01 std. deviation of εRP
ρRP 0.6 [0.4,0.9] 0.57 persistence of εRP
Resulting steady state ratios
YT/Y 0.37 LT/L 0.24
CN/Y 0.93 CT/Y 0.68
C∗/Y 0.08 BL/M 0.21
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Figure 4.1: EMBI spreads and investments for the LA-5 countries
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Figure 4.2: Empirical impulse responses to the country spread shock
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Figure 4.3: Empirical and theoretical impulse responses
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Figure 4.4: Selected theoretical impulses responses
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